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Our answer: not so well. We reach that conclusion after reviewing recent research on the role of
technology as a source of economic fluctuations. The bulk of the evidence suggests a limited role
for aggregate technology shocks, pointing instead to demand factors as the main force behind the
strong positive comovement between output and labor input measures.
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Centre de Recerca en Economia Internacional (CREI)







Since the seminal work of Kydland and Prescott (1982) and Prescott (1986a) proponents of the
Real Business Cycle (RBC) paradigm have claimed a central role for exogenous variations in
technology as a source of economic ﬂuctuations in industrialized economies. Those ﬂuctuations
have been interpreted by RBC economists as the equilibrium response to exogenous variations in
technology, in an environment with perfect competition and intertemporally optimizing agents,
and in which the role of nominal frictions and monetary policy is, at most, secondary.
Behind the claims of RBC theory lies what must have been one of the most revolution-
ary ﬁndings in postwar macroeconomics: a calibrated version of the neoclassical growth model
augmented with a consumption-leisure choice, and with stochastic changes in total factor pro-
ductivity as the only driving force, seems to account for the bulk of economic ﬂuctuations in
the postwar U.S. economy. In practice, “accounting for observed ﬂuctuations” has meant that
calibrated RBC models match pretty well the patterns of unconditional second moments of a
number of macroeconomic time series, including their relative standard deviations and correla-
tions. Such ﬁndings led Prescott to claim “...that technology shocks account for more than half
the ﬂuctuations in the postwar period, with a best point estimate near 75 percent.”1 Similarly,
in two recent assessments of the road traveled and the lessons learned by RBC theory after more
than a decade, Cooley and Prescott (1995) could conﬁdently claim that “it makes sense to think
of ﬂuctuations as caused by shocks to productivity,” while King and Rebelo (1999) concluded
that “...[the] main criticisms levied against ﬁrst-generation real business cycle models have been
largely overcome.”
While most macroeconomists have recognized the methodological impact of the RBC research
program and have adopted its modelling tools, other important, more substantive elements of
1Prescott (1996b)
2that program have been challenged in recent years. First, and in accordance with the widely
acknowledged importance of monetary policy in industrialized economies, the bulk of the profes-
sion has gradually moved away from real models (or their near-equivalent frictionless monetary
models) when trying to understand short run macroeconomic phenomena. Secondly, and most
importantly for the purposes of this paper, the view of technological change as a central force
behind cyclical ﬂuctuations has been called into question. In the present paper we focus on the
latter development, by providing an overview of the literature that has challenged the central
role of technology in business cycles.
Ad e ﬁning feature of the literature reviewed here lies in its search for evidence on the role of
technology that is “more direct” than just checking whether any given model driven by technol-
ogy shocks, and more or less plausibly calibrated, can generate the key features of the business
cycle. In particular we discuss eﬀorts to identify and estimate the empirical eﬀects of exogenous
changes in technology on diﬀerent macroeconomic variables, and to evaluate quantitatively the
contribution of those changes to business cycle ﬂuctuations.
Much of that literature (and, hence, much of the present paper) focuses on one central,
uncontroversial feature of the business cycle in industrialized economies, namely, the strong
positive comovement between output and labor input measures. That comovement is illustrated
graphically in Figure 1, which displays the quarterly time series for hours and output in the U.S.
nonfarm business sector over the period 1948:1-2002:4. In both cases the original series have
been transformed using the band-pass ﬁlter developed in Baxter and King (1994), calibrated to
remove ﬂuctuations of periodicity outside an interval between 6 and 32 quarters. As in Stock
and Watson (1999), we interpret the resulting series as reﬂecting ﬂuctuations associated with
business cycles.
As is well known, the basic RBC model can generate ﬂuctuations in labor input and output
of magnitude, persistence, and degree of comovement roughly similar to the series displayed in
3Figure 1. Furthermore, and as shown in King and Rebelo (1999), when the actual sequence
of technology shocks (proxied by the estimated disturbances of an AR process for the Solow
residual) is fed as an input into the model, the resulting equilibrium paths of output and labor
input track surprisingly well the observed historical patterns of those variables; the latter exercise
can be viewed as a more stringent test of the RBC model than the usual moment-matching.
The literature reviewed in the present paper asks, however, very diﬀerent questions: What
have been the eﬀects of technology shocks in the postwar U.S. economy? How do they diﬀer
from the predictions of standard RBC models? What is their contribution to business cycle
ﬂuctuations? What features must be incorporated in business cycle models to account for the
observed eﬀects? The remainder of this paper describes the tentative (and sometimes contra-
dictory) answers that the eﬀorts of a growing number of researchers have yielded. Some of that
research has exploited the natural role of technological change as a source of permanent changes
in labor productivity to identify technology shocks using structural VARs; other authors have
instead relied on more direct measures of technological change and examined their comovements
with a variety of macro variables. It is not easy to summarize in a few words the wealth of
existing evidence nor to agree on some deﬁnite conclusions of a literature that is still very much
ongoing. Nevertheless, it is safe to state that the bulk of the evidence reviewed in the present
paper provides little support to the initial claims of the RBC literature on the central role of
technological change as a source of business cycles.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews some of the early papers
that questioned the importance of technology shocks, and presents some of the basic evidence
regarding the eﬀects of those shocks. Section 3 discusses a number of criticisms and possible
pitfalls of that literature. Section 4 presents the case for the existence of nominal frictions as
an explanation of the estimated eﬀects of technology shocks. Section 5 summarizes some of the
real explanations for the same eﬀects found in the literature. Section 6 lays out and analyzes an
4estimated DSGE model that incorporates both nominal and real frictions, and evaluates their
respective role. Section 7 concludes.
2. Estimating the Eﬀects of Technology Shocks
In Galí (1999) the eﬀects of technology shocks were identiﬁed and estimated using a structural
VAR approach. In its simplest speciﬁcation, to which we restrict our analysis here, the empirical
model makes use of information on two variables: output and labor input, which we denote
respectively by yt and nt, both expressed in logs. Those variables are used to construct a
s e r i e sf o r( l o g )l a b o rp r o d u c t i v i t y ,xt ≡ yt − nt . In what follows the latter is assumed to be
integrated of order one (in a way consistent with the evidence reported below). Fluctuations in
labor productivity growth (∆xt) and in some stationary transformation of labor input (b nt)a r e
assumed to be a consequence of two types of shocks hitting the economy and propagating their

















 ≡ C(L) εt (2.1)
where εz
t and εd
t are serially uncorrelated, mutually orthogonal structural disturbances, whose
variance is normalized to unity. The polynomial |C(z)| is assumed to have all its roots outside
the unit circle. Estimates of the distributed lag polynomials Cij(L) are obtained by a suitable
transformation of the estimated reduced form VAR for [∆xt,b nt] after imposing the long run
identifying restriction C12(1) = 0.2 That restriction eﬀectively deﬁnes {εz
t} and {εd
t} as shocks
with and without a permanent eﬀect on labor productivity, respectively. On the basis of some
of the steady state restrictions shared by a broad range of macro models (and further discussed
below) Galí (1999) proposes to interpret permanent shocks to productivity {εz
t} as technology
2See Blanchard and Quah (1989) and Galí (1999) for details.
5shocks. On the other hand, transitory shocks {εd
t} can potentially capture a variety of driving
forces behind output and labor input ﬂuctuations that would not be expected to have permanent
eﬀects on labor productivity. The latter include shocks that could have a permanent eﬀect on
output (but not on labor productivity), but which are “non-technological” in nature, as would
be the case for some permanent shocks to preferences or government purchases, among others.3
As discussed below, they could in principle capture transitory technology shocks as well.
2.1. Revisiting the Basic Evidence on the Eﬀects of Technology Shocks
N e x t ,w er e v i s i ta n du pd a t et h eb a s i ce v i d e n c eo nt h ee ﬀects of technology shocks reported in Galí
(1999). Our baseline empirical analysis uses quarterly U.S. data for the period 1948:I-2002:IV.
Our source is the Haver USECON database, for which we list the associated mnemonics. Our
series for output corresponds to nonfarm business sector output (LXNFO). Our baseline labor
input series is hours of all persons in the nonfarm business sector (LXNFH). Below we often ex-
press the output and hours series in per capita terms, using a measure of civilian noninstitutional
population aged 16 and over (LNN).
Our baseline estimates are based on a speciﬁcation of hours in ﬁrst-diﬀerences, i.e. we set
b nt = ∆nt. That choice seems consistent with the outcome of ADF tests applied to the hours
series, which do not reject the null of a unit root in the level of hours at a 10 percent signiﬁcance
level, against the alternative of stationarity around a linear deterministic trend. On the other
hand, the null of a unit root in the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced series is rejected at a level of less than 1
percent.4 In a way consistent with the previous result, a KPSS test applied to nt rejects the
stationarity null with a signiﬁcance level below 1 percent, while failing to reject the same null
3It is precisely that feature what diﬀerentiates the approach to identiﬁcation in Galí (1999) from that in
Blanchard and Quah (1989). The latter authors used restrictions on long-run eﬀects on output, as opposed to
labor productivity. In the presence of a unit root in labor input that could lead to the mislabeling as “technology”
shocks of any disturbances that was behind the unit root in labor input.
4With four lags, the corresponding t−statistics are −2.5 and and −7.08 the level and ﬁrst-diﬀerence,
respectively.
6when applied to ∆nt. In addition, the same battery of ADF and KPSS tests applied to our xt
and ∆xt series support the existence of a unit root in labor productivity, a necessary condition
for the identiﬁcation strategy based on long-run restrictions employed here. Both observations
suggest the speciﬁcation and estimation of a VAR for [∆xt,∆nt]. Henceforth, we refer to the
latter as the diﬀerence speciﬁcation.
Figure 2 displays the estimated eﬀects of a positive technology shock, of size normalized to
one standard deviation. The graphs on the left show the dynamic responses of labor productivity,
output, and hours, together with (±) two standard error bands.5 The corresponding graphs on
the right show the simulated distribution of each variable’s response on impact.A s i n G a l í
(1999), the estimates point to a signiﬁcant and persistent decline in hours after a technology
shock that raises labor productivity permanently.6 The point estimates suggest that hours do
eventually return to their original level (or close to it), but not until more than a year later.
Along with that pattern of hours, we observe a positive but muted initial response of output in
the face of a positive technology shock.
The estimated responses to a technology shock displayed in Figure 2 contrast starkly with
the predictions of a standard calibrated RBC model, which would predict a positive comovement
among the three variables plotted in the ﬁgure in response to that shock.7
Not surprisingly, the previous estimates have dramatic implications regarding the sources of
the business cycle ﬂuctuations in output and hours displayed in Figure 1. This is illustrated
in Figure 3, which displays the estimated business cycle components of the historical series for
output and hours associated with technology and non-technology shocks. In both cases the
estimated components of the (log) levels of productivity and hours have been detrended using
5That distribution is obtained by means of a Montecarlo simulation based on 500 drawings from the distrib-
ution of the reduced-form VAR distribution.
6Notice that the distribution of the impact eﬀect on hours assigns a zero probability to an increase in that
variable.
7See, e.g., King et al. (1988) and Campbell (1994)
7t h es a m eb a n d - p a s sﬁlter underlying the series plotted in Figure 1. As in Galí (1999), the
picture that emerges is very clear: ﬂuctuations in hours and output driven by technology shocks
account for a small fraction of the variance of those variables at business cycle frequencies: 5
and 7 percent, respectively. Furthermore, the comovement at business cycle frequencies between
output and hours resulting from technology shocks is shown to be essentially zero (the correlation
is −0.08), in contrast with the high positive comovement observed in the data (0.88). Clearly,
the pattern of technology-driven ﬂuctuations, as identiﬁed in our structural VAR, shows little
resemblance with the conventional business cycle ﬂuctuations displayed in Figure 1.
The picture changes dramatically if we turn our attention to the estimated ﬂuctuations
of output and hours driven by shocks with no permanent eﬀects on productivity (displayed
in the bottom graph). Those shocks account for 95 and 93 percent of the variance of the
business cycle component of hours and output, respectively. In addition, they generate a nearly
perfect correlation (0.96) between the same variables. In contrast with its technology-driven
counterpart, this component of output and hours ﬂuctuations displays a far more recognizable
business cycle pattern.
A possible criticism to the above empirical framework is the assumption of only two driving
forces underlying the ﬂuctuations in hours and labor productivity. As discussed in Blanchard and
Quah (1989), ignoring some relevant shocks may lead to a signiﬁcant distortion in the estimated
impulse responses. Galí (1999) addresses that issue by estimating a ﬁve-variable VAR (including
time series on real balances, interest rates and inﬂation). That framework allows for as many as
four shocks with no permanent eﬀects on productivity, and for which no separate identiﬁcation
is attempted. The estimates generated by that higher-dimensional model regarding the eﬀects
of technology shocks are very similar to the ones reported above, suggesting that the focus on
two shocks only may not be restrictive for the issue at hand.8
8See also Francis and Ramey (2002), among others, for estimates using higher dimensional VARs.
82.2. Related Empirical Work
The empirical connection between technological change and business cycle ﬂuctuations has been
the focus of a rapidly expanding literature. Next we brieﬂy discuss some recent papers providing
evidence on the eﬀects of technology shocks, and which reach conclusion similar to Galí (1999),
while using a diﬀerent data set or empirical approach. We leave for later a discussion of the
papers whose ﬁndings relate more speciﬁcally to the content of other sections, including those
that question the evidence reported above.
An early contribution is given by the relatively unknown paper by Blanchard, Solow and
Wilson (1995). That paper already spells out some of the key arguments found in the subsequent
literature. In particular, it stresses the need to sort out the component of productivity associated
with exogenous technological change from that which varies in response to other shocks that
may aﬀect the capital-labor ratio. They adopt a simple instrumental variables approach, with a
number of demand-side variables assumed to be orthogonal to exogenous technological change
used as instruments for employment growth or the change in unemployment in a regression that
features productivity growth as a dependent variable. The ﬁtted residual in that regression is
interpreted as a proxy for technology-driven changes in productivity. When they regress the
change in unemployment on the “ﬁltered” productivity growth variable they obtain a positive
coeﬃcient, i.e. an (exogenous) increase in productivity drives the unemployment rate up. A
dynamic speciﬁcation of that regression implies that such an eﬀect lasts for about three quarters,
after which unemployment starts to fall and returns rapidly to its original value.
As mentioned in Galí (1999, footnote 19) and stressed by Valerie Ramey in her discussion, the
ﬁnding of a decline in hours (or an increase in unemployment) in response to a positive technology
shock could also have been detected by an attentive reader in a number of earlier VAR papers,
though that ﬁnding generally goes unnoticed or is described as puzzling. Blanchard and Quah
(1989) and Blanchard (1989) are exceptions in that they provide some explicit discussion of
9the ﬁnding, which they interpret as consistent with a traditional Keynesian model “in which
increases in productivity...may well increase unemployment in the short run if aggregate demand
does not increase enough to maintain employment”.9
The work of Basu, Fernald and Kimball (1999; BFK, henceforth) deserves special attention
here, given its focus and the similarity of its ﬁndings to those in Galí (1999) despite the use of an
unrelated methodology. BFK use a sophisticated growth accounting methodology allowing for
increasing returns, imperfect competition, variable factor utilization and sectoral compositional
eﬀects in order to uncover a time series for aggregate technological change in the postwar U.S.
economy. Their approach, combining elements of earlier work by Hall (1990) and Basu and
Kimball (1997) among others, can be viewed as an attempt to cleanse the Solow residual (Solow
(1957)) of its widely acknowledged measurement error resulting from the strong assumptions
underlying its derivation. Estimates of the response of the economy to innovations in their mea-
sure of technological change point to a sharp short run decline in the use of inputs (including
labor) when technology improves, with output showing no signiﬁcant change (with point esti-
mates suggesting a small decline). After that short-run impact both variables gradually adjust
upward, with labor input returning to its original level and with output reaching a permanently
higher plateau several years after the shock.
Kiley (1996) applies the structural VAR framework in Galí (1999) to data from two-digit
manufacturing industries. While he does not report impulse responses, he ﬁnds that technology
shocks induce a negative correlation between employment and output growth in 12 of the 17
industries considered. When he estimates an analogous conditional correlation for employment
and productivity growth, he obtains a negative value for 15 out of 17 industries. Francis (2001)
conducts a similar analysis, though he attempts to identify industry-speciﬁc technology shocks
by including a measure of aggregate technology, which is assumed to be exogenous to each of
9Blanchard (1989, p. 1158).
10the industries considered. He ﬁnds that, for the vast majority of industries, a sectoral labor
input measure declines in response to a positive industry-speciﬁc technology shock. Using data
from a large panel of 458 manufacturing industries and 35 sectors, Franco and Philippon (2004)
estimate a structural VAR with three shocks: technology shocks (with permanent eﬀects on
industry productivity), composition shocks (with permanent eﬀects on the industry share in
total output), and transitory shocks. They ﬁnd that technology shocks (i) generate a negative
comovement between output and hours within each industry, and (ii) are almost uncorrelated
across industries. Accordingly, they conclude that technology shocks can only account for a small
fraction of the variance of aggregate hours and output (with two thirds of the latter accounted
f o rb yt r a n s i t o r ys h o c k s ) .
Shea (1998) uses a structural VAR approach to model the connection between changes in
measures of technological innovation (R&D and number of patent applications) and subsequent
changes in TFP and hired inputs, using industry level data. For most speciﬁcations and in-
dustries he ﬁnds that an innovation in the technology indicator does not cause any signiﬁcant
change in TFP, but tends to increase labor inputs in the short run. While not much stressed
by Shea, however, one of the ﬁndings in his paper is particularly relevant for our purposes: in
the few VAR speciﬁcations for which a signiﬁcant increase in TFP is detected in response to a
positive innovation in the technology indicator, inputs—including labor—are shown to respond in
the direction opposite to the movement in TFP, a ﬁnding in line with the evidence above.10
Francis and Ramey (2003a) extend the analysis in Galí (1999) in several dimensions. The ﬁrst
modiﬁcation they consider consists in augmenting the baseline VAR (speciﬁed in ﬁrst diﬀerences)
with a capital tax rate measure in order to sort out the eﬀects of technology shocks from those
of permanent changes in tax rates (more below). Secondly, they identify technology shocks as
those with permanent eﬀects on real wages (as opposed to labor productivity) and/or no long run
10See the comment on Shea’s paper by Galí (1998) for a more detailed discussion of that point.
11eﬀects on hours, both equally robust predictions of a broad class of models that satisfy a balance
growth property. Those alternative identifying restrictions are not rejected when combined into
au n i ﬁed (overidentiﬁed) model. Francis and Ramey show that both the model augmented with
capital tax rates and the model with alternative identifying restrictions (considered separately
or jointly) imply impulse responses to a technology shock similar to those in Galí (1999) and,
in particular, a drop in hours in response to a positive technology shock.
Francis, Owyang and Theodorou (2003) use a variant of the sign restriction algorithm of
Uhlig (1999) and show that the ﬁnding of a negative response of hours to a positive technology
shock is robust to replacing the restriction on the asymptotic eﬀe c to ft h a ts h o c kw i t ho n et a k i n g
imposing a positive response of productivity at a horizon of ten years after the shock.
A number of recent papers have provided related evidence based on non-U.S. aggregate data.
In Galí (1999) the structural VAR framework discussed above is also applied to the remaining G7
countries (Canada, U.K., France, Germany, Italy, and Japan). He uncovers a negative response
of employment to a positive technology shock in all countries, with the exception of Japan. Galí
(1999) also point out some diﬀerences in those estimates relative to those obtained for the U.S.:
in particular, the (negative) employment response to a positive technology shocks in Germany
, the U.K. and Italy appears to be larger and more persistent, which could be interpreted as
evidence of “hysteresis” in European labor markets. Very similar qualitative results for the euro
area as a whole can also be found in Galí (2004), which applies the same empirical framework
to the quarterly data set which has been recently available. In particular, technology shocks
are found to account for only 5 percent and 9 percent of the variance of the business cycle
component of euro area employment and output, respectively, with the corresponding correlation
between their technology-driven components being −0.67). Francis and Ramey (2003b) estimate
a structural VAR with long-run identifying restrictions using long-term U.K. annual time series
tracing back to the nineteenth century; they ﬁnd robust evidence of a negative short-run impact
12of technology shocks on labor in every subsample.11 Finally, Carlsson (2000) develops a variant
of the empirical framework in BFK (1999) and Burnside et al. (1995) to construct a time
series for technological change, and applies it to a sample of Swedish two-digit manufacturing
industries. Most prominently, he ﬁnds that positive shocks to technology have, on impact, a
contractionary eﬀect on hours and a non-expansionary eﬀect on output, as in BFK (1999).
2.3. Implications
The implications of the evidence discussed above for business cycle analysis and modelling are
manifold. Most signiﬁcantly, those ﬁndings reject a key prediction of the standard RBC par-
adigm, namely, the positive comovement of output, labor input and productivity in response
to technology shocks. That positive comovement is the single main feature of that model that
accounts for its ability to generate ﬂuctuations that resemble business cycles. Hence, taken at
face value, the evidence above rejects in an unambiguous fashion the empirical relevance of the
standard RBC model. It does so in two dimensions. First, it shows that a key feature of the econ-
omy’s response to aggregate technology shocks predicted by calibrated RBC models cannot be
found in the data. Secondly, and to the extent that one takes the positive comovement between
measures of output and labor input as a deﬁning characteristic of the business cycle, it follows
as a corollary that technology shocks cannot be a quantitatively important (and, even less, a
dominant) source of observed aggregate ﬂuctuations. While the latter implication is particu-
larly damning for RBC theory, given its traditional emphasis on aggregate technology variations
as a source of business cycles, its relevance is independent of one’s preferred macroeconomic
paradigm.
11The latter evidence contrasts with their analysis of long term U.S. data, in which the results vary signiﬁcantly
across samples and appear to depend on the speciﬁcation used (more below).
133. Possible Pitfalls in the Estimation of the Eﬀects of Technology Shocks
This section has two main objectives. First, we try address a question that is often raised
regarding the empirical approach used in Galí (1999): to what extent can we be conﬁdent in
the economic interpretation given to the identiﬁed shocks and, in particular, in the mapping
between technology shocks and the nonstationary component of labor productivity? Below we
provide some evidence that makes us feel quite comfortable about that interpretation. Second,
we describe and address some of the econometric issues that Christiano, Eichenbaum, and
Vigfusson (2003) have raised in a recent paper, and which focus on the appropriate speciﬁcation
of hours (levels or ﬁrst diﬀerences). Finally, we discuss a recent paper by Fisher (2003), which
distinguishes between two types of technology shocks, neutral and investment-speciﬁc.
3.1. Are Long Run Restrictions Useful in Identifying Technology Shocks?
The approach to identiﬁcation proposed in Galí (1999) relies on the assumption that only (per-
manent) technology shocks can have a permanent eﬀect on (average) labor productivity. That
assumption can be argued to hold under relatively weak conditions, satisﬁed by the bulk of busi-
ness cycle models currently used by macroeconomists. To review the basic argument consider
an economy whose technology can be described by an aggregate production function12
Yt = F(Kt,A tNt) (3.1)
where Y denotes output, K is the capital stock, N is labor input and A is an index of technology.
Under the assumption that F is homogeneous of degree 1, we have
Yt
Nt
= At Fk (kt,1) (3.2)
12An analogous but somewhat more detailed analysis can be found in Francis and Ramey (2003a)
14where kt ≡ Kt
AtNt is the ratio of capital to labor (expressed in eﬃciency units). For a large class
of models characterized by an underlying balanced growth path, the marginal product of capital
Fk must satisfy, along that path, a condition of the form
(1 − τ) Fk (k,1) = (1 + µ)
³





where µ is the price markup, τ is a tax on capital income, ρ is the time discount rate, δ is the
depreciation rate, σ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, and γ is the average growth
rate of (per capita) consumption and output. Under the assumption of decreasing returns to
capital, it follows from (3.3) that the capital labor ratio k will be stationary (and will thus
ﬂuctuate around a constant mean) so long as all the previous parameters are constant (or
stationary). In that case, (3.2) implies that only shocks that have a permanent eﬀect on the
technology parameter A can be a source of the unit root in labor productivity, thus providing
the theoretical underpinning for the identiﬁcation scheme in Galí (1999).
How plausible are the assumptions underlying that identiﬁcation scheme? Preference or
technology parameters like ρ, δ, σ,a n dγ are generally assumed to be constant in most examples
and applications found in the business cycle literature. The price markup µ is more likely to
vary over time, possibly as a result of some embedded price rigidities; in the latter case, however,
it is likely to remain stationary, ﬂuctuating around its desired or optimal level. In the event
that desired markups (or the preference and technology parameters listed above) displayed some
non stationarity, the latter would more likely take the form of some smooth function of time,
which should be reﬂected in the deterministic component of labor productivity, but not in its
ﬂuctuations at cyclical frequencies.13Finally, it is important to notice that the previous approach
to identiﬁcation of technology shocks requires that (i) Fk be decreasing, so that k is uniquely
13Of course that was also the traditional view regarding technological change, but one that was challenged by
the RBC school.
15pinned down by (3.3), and (ii) that the technology process {At} is exogenous (at least with
respect to the business cycle). The previous assumptions have been commonly adopted by
business cycle modelers.14
3.1.1. Do Capital Income Tax Shocks Explain Permanent Changes in Labor Pro-
ductivity ?
The previous argument, however, is much less appealing when applied to the capital income tax
rate. As Uhlig (2004) and others have pointed out, the assumption of a stationary capital income
tax rate may be unwarranted, given the behavior of measures for that variable over the postwar
period. This is illustrated graphically in Figure 4, which displays two alternative measures of
the capital income tax rate in the U.S.. Figure 4.A displays a quarterly series for the average
capital income tax rate constructed by Jones (2002) for the period 1958:I-1997:IV. Figure 4.B
shows an annual measure of the average marginal capital income tax rate constructed by Ellen
McGrattan for the period 1958-1992 and which corresponds to an updated version of the one
used in McGrattan (1994).15 Henceforth we denote those series by τJ
t and τM
t , respectively.
Both series display an apparent non-stationary behavior, with highly persistent ﬂuctuations.
This is conﬁrmed by a battery of ADF tests, which fail to reject the null hypothesis of a unit
root in both series, at conventional signiﬁcance levels.
Furthermore, as evidenced in Figures 4.C and 4.D, which display the same series in ﬁrst
diﬀerences, the presence of sizeable short-run variations in those measures of capital taxes could
hardly be captured by means of some deterministic or smooth function of time (their standard
deviations being 0.79 % for the quarterly Jones series, and 2.4%for the annual McGrattan se-
ries). In fact, in both cases that ﬁrst-diﬀerenced series ∆τt shows no signiﬁcant autocorrelation,
14Exceptions include stochastic versions of endogenous growth models, as in King et al. (1988b). In those
models any transitory shock can in principle have a permanent eﬀect on the level of capital or disembodied
technology and, as a result, on labor productivity.
15We are grateful to Craig Burnside and Ellen McGrattan for providing the data.
16suggesting that a random walk process can approximate the pattern of capital income tax rates
pretty well.
The previous evidence, combined with the theoretical analysis above, points to a potential
caveat in the identiﬁcation approach followed in Galí (1999): the shocks with permanent eﬀects
on productivity estimated therein could be capturing the eﬀects of permanent changes in tax
rates (as opposed to those of genuine technology shocks). That “mislabeling” could potentially
account for the empirical ﬁndings reported above.
Francis and Ramey (2003a) attempt to overcome that potential shortcoming by augmenting
the VAR with a capital tax rate variable, in addition to labor productivity and hours. As
mentioned above, the introduction of the tax variable is shown not to have any signiﬁcant
inﬂuence on the ﬁndings: positive technology shocks still lead to short run declines in labor.
Here we revisit the hypothesis of a “tax rate shock mistaken for a technology shock” by
looking for evidence of some comovement between (i) the “permanent” shock εz
t estimated using
the structural VAR discussed in section 2, and (ii) each of the two capital tax series, in ﬁrst-
diﬀerences. Given the absence of signiﬁcant autocorrelation in ∆τJ
t and ∆τM
t , we interpret each
of those those series as (alternative) proxies for the shocks to the capital income tax rate. Also,
when using the McGrattan series, we annualize the “permanent” shock series obtained from the
quarterly VAR by averaging the shocks corresponding to each natural year.
The resulting evidence can be summarized as follows. First, innovations to the capital income
tax rate show a near zero correlation with the permanent shocks from the VAR. More precisely,




t) are, respectively, −0.06 and 0.12,n e i t h e ro f
which is signiﬁcant at conventional levels. Thus, it is highly unlikely that the permanent VAR
shocks may be capturing exogenous shocks to capital taxes.
Secondly, an OLS regression of the Jones tax series ∆τJ
t on current and lagged values of εz
t
yields jointly insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient estimates: the p-value is 0.54 when four lags are included,
170.21 when we include eight lags. A similar result obtains when we regress the McGrattan tax
series ∆τM
t on current and several lags of εz
t,w i t ht h ep-value for the null of zero coeﬃcients
being 0.68 when four lags are included (0.34 when we use 8 lags). Since the sequence of those
coeﬃcients corresponds to the estimated impulse response of capital taxes to the permanent
VAR shock, the previous evidence suggests that the estimated eﬀects of the permanent VAR
shocks are unlikely to be capturing the impact of a possible endogenous response in capital taxes
to whatever exogenous shock underlies the estimated permanent VAR shock.
We conclude from the previous exercises that there is no support for the hypothesis that the
permanent shocks to labor productivity, interpreted in Galí (1999) as technology shocks, could
be instead capturing changes in capital income taxes.16
3.1.2. Do Permanent Shocks to Labor Productivity Capture Variations in Technol-
ogy?
Having all but ruled out variations in capital taxes as a signiﬁcant factor behind the unit root
in labor productivity, we next present some evidence that favors the interpretation of the VAR
permanent shock as a shift to aggregate technology. In addition we also provide some evidence
against the hypothesis that transitory variations in technology may be a signiﬁcant force behind
the shocks identiﬁed as transitory shocks, a hypothesis that cannot be ruled out on purely
theoretical grounds.
Francis and Ramey (2003a) test a weak form of the hypothesis of permanent shocks as
technology shocks, by looking for evidence of Granger-causality between a number of indicators
that are viewed as independent of technology on the one hand, and the VAR-based technology
shock on the other. The indicators include the Romer and Romer (1989) monetary shock dummy,
the Hoover and Perez (1994) oil shock dummies, Ramey and Shapiro’s military buildup dates
16A similar conclusion is obtained by Fisher (2003), using a related approach in the context of the multiple
technology shock model described below.
18(1998), and the federal funds rate. Francis and Ramey show that none of them have a signiﬁcant
predictive power for the estimated technology shock.
Here we provide a more direct assessment by making use of the measure of aggregate techno-
logical change obtained by Basu, Fernald and Kimball (1999; BFK, henceforth).17 As discussed
earlier, those authors constructed that series using an approach unrelated to ours. The BFK
variable measures the annual rate of technological change in the U.S. nonfarm private business
sector. The series has an annual frequency and covers the period 1950-1989. Our objective here
is to assess the plausibility of the technology-related interpretation of the VAR shocks obtained
above by examining their correlation with the BFK measure. Given the diﬀerences in frequencies
we annualize both the “permanent” and “transitory” shock series obtained from the quarterly
VAR by averaging the shocks corresponding to each natural year.
The main results can be summarized as follows. First, the correlation between the VAR-
based permanent shock and the BFK measure of technological change is positive and signiﬁcant
at the 5 percent level, with a point estimate of 0.45. The existence of a positive contemporane-
ous comovement is apparent in Figure 5, which displays the estimated VAR permanent shock
together with the BFK measure (both series have been normalized to have zero mean and unit
variance, for ease of comparison).
Secondly, the correlation between our estimated VAR transitory shock and the BFK series
is slightly negative, though insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero (the point estimate is −0.04). The
bottom graph of Figure 5, which displays both series, illustrates the absence of any obvious
comovement between the two.
Finally, and given that the BFK series is mildly serially correlated, we have also run a simple
OLS regression of the (normalized) BFK variable on its own lag, and the contemporaneous
17In particular, we use their “fully corrected” series from their 1999 paper When revising the present paper
BFK made us aware of an updated version of their technology series, extending the sample period through to
1996, and incorporating some methodological changes. The results obtained with the updated series were almost
identical to the ones reported below.
19estimates of the permanent and transitory shocks from the VAR. The estimated equation, with










which reinforces the ﬁndings obtained from the simple contemporaneous correlations.
In summary, the results from the above empirical analysis suggest that the VAR-based per-
manent shocks may indeed be capturing exogenous variations in technology, in a way consistent
with the interpretation made in Galí (1999). In addition, we cannot ﬁnd evidence supporting
the view that the VAR transitory shocks—which were shown in Section 2 to be the main source
of business cycle ﬂuctuations in hours and output—may be related to changes in technology.
3.2. Robustness to Alternative VAR Speciﬁcations
In a recent paper, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Vigfusson (2003; CEV, henceforth ) have ques-
tioned some of the VAR-based evidence regarding the eﬀects of technology shocks found in Galí
(1999) and Francis and Ramey (2003a), on the basis of their lack of robustness to the trans-
formation of labor input used. In particular, CEV argue that ﬁrst-diﬀerencing the (log) of per
capita hours may distort the sign of the estimated response of that variable to a technology
shock, if that variable is truly stationary. Speciﬁcally, their ﬁndings based on a bivariate VAR
model in which (per capita) hours are speciﬁed in levels (b nt = nt) imply that output, hours, and
productivity all rise in response to a positive technology shock. On the other hand, when they
use a diﬀerence speciﬁcation they obtain results similar to the ones reported above, i.e. a nega-
tive comovement between output (or productivity) and hours in response to technology shocks.
Perhaps most interestingly, CEV discuss the extent to which the ﬁndings obtained under the
level speciﬁcation can be accounted for under the assumption that the diﬀerence speciﬁcation is
the correct one, and viceversa. Given identical priors over the two speciﬁcations, that “encom-
20passing” analysis leads them to conclude that the odds in favor of the level speciﬁcation relative
to the diﬀerence speciﬁcation are about 2 to 1.18 CEV obtain similar results when incorporating
additional variables in the VAR.
Our own estimates of the dynamic responses to a technology shock when we specify (per
capita) hours in levels do indeed point to some qualitative diﬀerences. In particular, as shown in
an appendix available on request, the point estimate of the impact response of hours worked to
a positive technology is now positive, though very small. Yet, and in contrast with the ﬁndings
in CEV, that impact eﬀect and indeed the entire dynamic response of hours is not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero. The sign of the point estimates, however, is suﬃcient to generate a positive
correlation (0.88) between output and hours conditional on the technology shock. Furthermore,
as reported in the second row of Table 1, under the level speciﬁcation, technology shocks still
account for a (relatively) small fraction of the variance of output and hours at business cycle
frequencies (37 and 11 percent, respectively), though that fraction is larger than the one implied
by the diﬀerence speciﬁcation estimates.19
While we ﬁnd the encompassing approach adopted by CEV enlightening, their strategy of
pairwise comparisons with uniform priors (which mechanically assigns a 1
2 prior to the level
speciﬁcation) may lead to some bias in the conclusions. In particular, a simple look at a plot of
the time series for (log) per capita hours worked in the U.S. over the postwar period, displayed in
Figure 6, is not suggestive of stationarity, at least in the absence of any further transformation.
In particular, and in agreement with the ADF and KPSS tests reported above, the series seems
perfectly consistent with a unit root process, though possibly not a pure random walk. On
the basis of a cursory look at the same plot, and assuming that one wishes to maintain the
18That odds ratio increases substantially when an F statistic associated with a covariates ADF test is incor-
porated as part of the encompassing analysis.
19With the exception of their bivariate model under a level speciﬁcation, CEV also ﬁnd the contribution of
technology shocks to the variance of output and hours at business cycles to be small (below 20 percent). In their
bivariate, level speciﬁcation model that contribution is as high as 66 and 33 percent, respectively.
21assumption of a stationary process for the stochastic component of (log) per capita hours, a
quadratic function of time would appear to be a more plausible characterization of the trend
than just the constant implicit in CEV’s analysis. In fact, an OLS regression of that variable on a
constant, time and time squared yields a highly signiﬁcant coeﬃc i e n ta s s o c i a t e dw i t hb o t ht i m e
variables. Furthermore, a test of a unit root on the residual from that regression fails to reject
that hypothesis, while the KPSS does not reject the null of stationarity, at a 5 percentsigniﬁcance
level in both cases.20 Figure 6 displays the ﬁtted quadratic trend and the associated residual,
illustrating graphically that point. When we re-estimate the dynamic responses to a technology
shock using detrended (log) per capita hours we ﬁnd again a decline in hours in response to
positive technology shock, and a slightly negative (−0.11) conditional correlation between the
business cycle components of output and hours. In addition, the estimated contribution of
technology shocks to the variance of output and hours is very small (7 and 5 percent, essentially
the same as under diﬀerence speciﬁcation; see Table 1).21
In order to further assess the robustness of the above results we have also conducted the
same analysis using a speciﬁcation of the VAR using an alternative measure of labor input,
namely, (log) total hours, without a normalization by working age population. As it should be
clear from the discussion in section 3.1, the identiﬁcation strategy proposed in Galí (1999) and
implemented here should be valid independently of whether labor input is measured in per capita
terms or not, since labor productivity in invariant to that normalization.22 The second panel
in Table 1 summarizes the results corresponding to three alternative transformations considered
(ﬁrst diﬀerences, levels, quadratic detrending). In the three cases a positive technology shock
20Given the previous observations one wonders how an identical prior for both speciﬁcations could be assumed,
as CEV do when computing the odds ratio.
21Unfortunately, CEV do not include any statistic associated with the null of no trend in hours in their
encompassing analysis. While it is certainly possible that one can get a t statistic as high as 8.13 on the time-
squared term with a thirteen percent frequency when the true model contains no trend (as their Montercarlo
analysis suggests), it must surely be the case that such a frequency is much higher when the true model contains
the quadratic trend as estimated in the data !
22In fact, total hours was the series used originally in Galí (1999).
22is estimated to have a strong and statistically signiﬁcant negative impact on hours worked, at
least in the short run. Interestingly, under the level and detrended transformations that negative
response of hours is suﬃciently strong to pull down output in the short-run, despite the increase
in productivity. Note however that the estimated decline in output is not signiﬁcant in either
case.23 Furthermore, the estimated contribution of technology shocks to the variance of the
business cycle component of output and hours is small in all cases, with the largest share being
36 percent of the variance of hours, obtained under the level and detrended speciﬁcations.
As an additional check on the robustness of our ﬁndings, we have also estimated all the model
speciﬁcations discussed above using employment as labor input measure (instead of hours), and
real GDP as an output measure. A summary of our results for the six speciﬁcations considered
using employment and GDP can be in Table 2. The results under this speciﬁcation are much
more uniform: independently of the transformation of employment used, our estimates point to
a decline in that variable in the short run in response to a positive technology shock, as well
as a very limited contribution of technology shocks to the variance of GDP and employment.
We should stress that those ﬁndings obtain even when we specify employment rate in levels,
even though the short run decline in employment is not statistically signiﬁcant in that case. In
summary, the previous robustness exercise based on postwar U.S. data has shown that, for all
but one of the transformations of hours used, we uncover a decline in labor input in response
to a positive technology shock, in a way consistent with the literature reviewed in section 2.
The exception corresponds to the level speciﬁcation of per capita hours, but even in that case
the estimated positive response of hours does not appear to be signiﬁcant. In most cases the
contribution of technology shocks to the variance of the cyclical component of output and hours
is very small, and always below 40 percent. Finally, and possibly with the exception mentioned
above, the pattern of comovement of output and hours at business cycle frequencies resulting
23The ﬁnding of a slight short run decline in output was obtained in BFK (1999).
23from technology shocks, fails to resemble the one associated with postwar U.S. business cycles.
As further discussed in Valerie Ramey’s discussion to this paper, Fernald (2004) makes an
important contribution to the debate, by uncovering the most likely source of the discrepancy
of the estimates when hours are introduced in levels. In particular he shows that the existence
of a low frequency correlation between labor productivity growth and per capita hours. As
illustrated through a number of simulations, the presence of such a correlation, while unrelated
to the higher frequency phenomena of interest, can distort signiﬁcantly the estimated short-run
responses. Fernald illustrates that point most forcefully by re-estimating the structural VAR
in its levels speciﬁcation (as in CEV), though allowing for two (statistically signiﬁcant) trend
breaks in labor productivity (in 1973:I and 1997:II): the implied impulse responses point to a
signiﬁcant decline in hours in response to a technology shock, a result that also obtains when
the diﬀerence speciﬁcation is used.
Additional evidence on the implications of alternative transformations of hours using annual
time series spanning more than a century is provided by Francis and Ramey (2003b). Their
ﬁndings based on US data point to considerable sensitivity of the estimates across subsample
periods and the choice of transformation for hours. In order to assess the validity of the diﬀerent
speciﬁcations they look at their implications for the persistence of the productivity response to
a non-technology shock, the plausibility of the patterns of estimated technology shocks, as well
as the predictability of the latter (the Hall-Evans test). On the basis of that analysis they
conclude that ﬁrst-diﬀerenced and, to a lesser extent, quadratically detrended hours yields are
the most plausible speciﬁcation. Francis and Ramey show that in their data those two preferred
speciﬁcations generate a short run negative comovement between hours and output in response
to a shock that has a permanent eﬀect on technology in the postwar period. In the pre-WWII
period, however, the diﬀerence speciﬁcation yields an increase in hours in response to a shock
that raises productivity permanently. On the other hand, when they repeat the exercise using
24UK data (and a diﬀerence speciﬁcation) they ﬁnd a clear negative comovement of employment
and output both in the pre-WWII and postwar sample periods.24
In light of those results and the ﬁndings in the literature discussed above, we conclude that
there is no clear evidence favoring a conventional RBC interpretation of economic ﬂuctuations
as being largely driven by technology shocks, at least when the latter take the form assumed in
the standard one-sector RBC model. Next we consider how the previous assessment is aﬀected
once we allow for technology shocks that are investment-speciﬁc.
3.3. Investment-Speciﬁc Technology Shocks
In a series of papers, Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huﬀman (1998), and Greenwood, Hercowitz,
and Krusell (1997, 2000; henceforth, GHK) put forward and analyze a version of an RBC model
in which the main source of technological change is speciﬁc to the investment sector. In the
proposed framework, and in contrast with the standard RBC model, a technology shock does
not have any immediate impact on the production function. Instead, it aﬀects the rate of
transformation between current consumption and productive capital in the future. Thus, any
eﬀects on current output must be the result of the ability of that shock in eliciting a change
in the quantity of input services hired by ﬁrms. GHK (1997, 2000) motivate the interest in
studying the potential role of investment-speciﬁc technology shocks by pointing to the large
variations in measures of the relative price of new equipment constructed by Gordon (1990),
both over the long-run as well as at business cycle frequencies. In particular, GHK (2000)
analyze a calibrated model in which investment-speciﬁc technology shocks are the only driving
force. They conclude that the latter can account for about 30 percent of US output ﬂuctuations,
a relatively modest ﬁgure compared to the claim of the earlier RBC literature regarding the
24Pesavento and Rossi (2003) propose an agnostic procedure to estimate the eﬀects of a technology shock which
does not require taking a stance on the order of integration of hours. They ﬁnd that a positive technology shock
has a negative eﬀect on hours on impact.
25contribution of aggregate, sector-neutral technology shocks in calibrated versions of one-sector
RBC models.
In a recent paper, Fisher (2003) revisits the evidence on the eﬀects of technology shocks
and their role in the US business cycle, using an empirical framework that allows for separately
identiﬁed sector-neutral and investment-speciﬁc technology shocks (which, following Fisher, we
refer to respectively as N-shocks and I-shocks, for short). In a way consistent with the identi-
ﬁcation scheme proposed in Galí (1999) both types of technology shocks are allowed to have a
permanent eﬀect on labor productivity (in contrast with non-technology shocks). Yet, and in a
way consistent with the GHK framework, only investment-speciﬁc technology shocks are allowed
to aﬀect permanently the relative price of new investment goods. Using times series for labor
productivity, per capita hours, and the price of equipment (as a ratio to the consumption goods
deﬂator) constructed by Cummins and Violante (2002), Fisher estimates impulse responses to
the two types of shocks, and their relative contribution to business cycle ﬂuctuations. We have
conducted a similar exercise on our own, and summarized some the ﬁndings in Table 3.25 For
each type of technology shock and speciﬁcation the table reports its contribution to the vari-
ance of the business cycle component of output and hours, as well as the implied conditional
correlation between those two variables.
The top panel in Table 3 corresponds to three speciﬁcations using per capita hours worked,
the labor input variable to which Fisher (2003) restricts his analysis. Not surprisingly, our
results essentially replicate some of his ﬁndings. In particular, we see that under the three
transformations of labor input measures considered, N-shocks are estimated to have a negligible
contribution to the variance of output and hours at business cycle frequencies, and to generate
a very low correlation between those two variables.
The results for I-shocks are diﬀerent in at least two respects. Firstly, and as stressed in Fisher
25We thank Jonas Fisher for kindly providing the data on real investment price.
26(2003), I-shocks generate a high positive correlation between output and hours. The last column
of Table 3 tells us that such a result holds for all labor input measures and transformations
considered. As argued in the introduction, that property must be satisﬁed by any shock that
plays a central role as a source of business cycles. Of course, this is a necessary, not a suﬃcient
condition. Whether the contribution of I-shocks to business cycle ﬂuctuations is large or not
depends once again on the transformation of labor input used. Table 3 shows that when that
variable is speciﬁed in levels, it accounts for more than half of the variance of output and hours
at business cycle frequencies, a result that appears to be independent of the speciﬁc labor input
measure used. On the other hand, when hours or employment are speciﬁed in ﬁrst diﬀerences or
are quadratically detrended the contribution becomes much smaller, and always remains below
one-fourth.
What do we conclude from this exercise? First of all, the evidence does not speak with a
single voice: whether a technology shocks are given a prominent role or not as source of business
cycles depends on the transformation of the labor input measure used in the analysis. Perhaps
more interestingly, the analysis of the previous empirical model makes it clear that if some form
of technological change plays a signiﬁcant role as a source of economic ﬂuctuations, it is not
likely to be of the aggregate, sector-neutral kind that the early RBC literature emphasized,
but of the investment-speciﬁc kind stressed in GHK (2000). Finally, and leaving aside the
controversial question of the importance of technology shocks, the previous ﬁndings, as well as
those in Fisher (2003), raise a most interesting issue: why do I-shocks appear to generate the
sort of strong positive comovement between output and labour input measures that characterizes
business cycles, while that property is conspicuously absent when we consider N-shocks? Below
we attempt to provide a partial explanation for this seeming paradox.
274. Explaining the Eﬀects of Technology Shocks
I nt h ep r e s e n ts e c t i o nw eb r i e ﬂy discuss some of the economic explanations for the “anomalous”
response of labor input measures to technology shocks. As a matter of simple accounting, ﬁrms’
use of inputs (and labor, in particular) will decl i n ei nr e s p o n s et oap o s i t i v et e c h n o l o g ys h o c k
only if they choose (at least on average) to adjust their level of output less than proportionally to
the increase in total factor productivity. Roughly speaking we can think of two broad classes of
factors which are absent in the standard RBC model and which could potentially generate that
result. The ﬁrst class involves the presence of nominal frictions, combined with certain monetary
policies. The second set of explanations is unrelated to the existence of nominal frictions, so we
refer to it as “real” explanations. We discuss them in turn next.
4.1. The Role of Nominal Frictions
A possible explanation for the negative response of labor to a technology shock, put forward
both in Galí (1999) and BFK (1999), relies on the presence of nominal rigidities. As a matter
of principle, nominal rigidities should not, in themselves, necessarily be a source of the observed
employment response. Nevertheless, when prices are not fully ﬂexible, the equilibrium response
of employment (or, for that matter, of any other endogenous variable) to any real shock (includ-
ing a technology shock) is not invariant to the monetary policy rule in place; in particular, it will
be shaped by how the monetary authority reacts to the shock under consideration.26 Diﬀerent
monetary policy rules will thus imply diﬀerent equilibrium responses of output and employment
to a technology shock, ceteris paribus.
Galí (1999) provided some intuition behind that result by focusing on a stylized model
economy in which the relationship yt = mt − pt holds in equilibrium,27 ﬁrms set prices in
26See the discussion in McGrattan (1999), Dotsey (2002), and Galí, López-Salido and Vallés (2003), among
others.
27This would be consistent with any model in which velocity is constant in equilibrium (see Galí (1999) for an
28advance (implying a predetermined price level), and the central bank follows a simple money-
supply rule. It is easy to see that, in that context, employment will experience a short-run decline
in response to a positive technology shocks, unless the central bank endogenously expands the
money supply (at least) in proportion to the increase in productivity. Galí (2003) shows that
the previous ﬁnding generalizes (for a broad range of parameter values) to an economy with
staggered-price setting, and a more realistic interest elasticity of money demand, but still an
exogenous money supply. In that case, even though all ﬁrms will experience a decline in their
marginal cost only a fraction of them will adjust their prices downwards in the short run.
Accordingly, the aggregate price level will decline, and real balances and aggregate demand will
rise. Yet, when the fraction of ﬁrms adjusting prices is suﬃciently small, the implied increase in
aggregate demand will be less than proportional to the increase in productivity. That, in turn,
induces a decline in aggregate employment.
Many economists have criticized the previous argument on the grounds that it relied on a
speciﬁc and unrealistic assumption regarding how monetary policy is conducted, namely, that
of a money-based rule (e.g., Dotsey (2002)).
In the next subsection we address that criticism by analyzing the eﬀects of technology shocks
in the context of a simple illustrative model with a more plausible staggered price-setting struc-
ture, and a monetary policy characterized by an interest rate rule similar to the one proposed
by Taylor (1993). The model is simple enough to generate closed-form expressions for the re-
sponses of output and employment to variations in technology, thus allowing us to illustrate the
main factors shaping that response and thus generating a negative comovement between the two
variables.
e x a m p l eo fs u c ha ne c o n o m y ) .
294.1.1. A Simple Illustrative Model
The model we use to illustrate the role of nominal rigidities and monetary policy in shaping the
eﬀects of technology shocks is a standard New Keynesian framework with staggered price setting
a la Calvo (1983). Its equilibrium dynamics can be summarized as follows. On the demand side
output is determined by a forward-looking IS-type equation:
yt = Et{yt+1} − σ (rt − Et{πt+1}) (4.1)
where yt denotes (log) output, rt is the nominal interest rate, and πt ≡ pt − pt−1 denotes the
rate of inﬂation between t−1 and t. Parameter σ can be broadly interpreted a measure of the
sensitivity of aggregate demand to changes in interest rates and, thus, of the “eﬀectiveness” of
monetary policy.
Inﬂation evolves according to a forward-looking new Keynesian Phillips curve
πt = β Et{πt+1} + κ (yt − yt) (4.2)
where yt is the natural level of output (or potential output, for short), deﬁned as the one
that would prevail in the absence of nominal frictions. Equivalently, yt can be interpreted
as the equilibrium output generated by some background real business cycle model driven by
technology. The previous equation can be derived from the aggregation of optimal price-setting
decisions by ﬁrms subject to price adjustment constraints à la Calvo. In that context, coeﬃcient
κ is inversely related to the degree of price stickiness: stronger nominal rigidities imply a smaller
response of inﬂation to any given sequence of output gaps.
For simplicity we assume that exogenous random variations in productivity are the only
source of ﬂuctuations in the economy and, hence, the determinants of potential output. Accord-
30ingly, we postulate the following reduced form expression for potential output:28
yt = ψy at (4.3)
where at represents an exogenous technology parameter. The latter is assumed to follows an
AR(1) process at = ρa at−1 + εt,w h e r eρa ∈ [0,1]. Notice that under the assumption of an
aggregate production function of the form yt = at +( 1− α) nt,w ec a nd e r i v et h ef o l l o w i n g
expression for the natural level of employment nt
nt = ψn at
where ψn ≡
ψy−1
1−α . Since we want to think of the previous conditions as a reduced-form repre-
sentation of the equilibrium of a standard calibrated RBC model (without having to specify its
details), it is natural to assume ψy ≥ 1 (and, hence, ψn > 0). In that case, a positive technology
shock generates an increase in both output and employment, as generally implied by the RBC
models under conventional calibrations. Notice that it is precisely that property which makes it
possible for any technology-driven RBC model to generate equilibrium ﬂuctuations which repli-
cate some key features of observed business cycles, including a positive comovement of output
and employment.29
In that context, a natural question that arises is the extent to which the comovement of
output and employment in response to technology shocks found in the evidence described above
may have been the result of the way monetary policy has been conducted in the U.S. and other
industrialized economies. In order to illustrate that point, we embed in the context of the
28Such a reduced form relationship would naturally arise as an equilibrium condition of a simple RBC model
with productivity as the only state variable.
29The absence of another state variable (say, capital stock or other disturbances) implies a perfect correlation
between the natural levels of output and employment, in contrast with existing RBC models in the literature
where that correlation is positive and very high, but not one.
31simple model above, by deriving the implications for the eﬀects of technology shocks of having
the central bank follow an interest rate rule of the form
rt = φπ πt + φy yt (4.4)
A rule similar to (4.4) has been proposed by Taylor (1993) and others as a good charac-
terization of monetary policy in the U.S. and other industrialized economies in recent decades.
Notice that, as in Taylor, we assume that the monetary authority responds to output (or its
deviations from trend), and not to the output gap. We view this as a more realistic description
of actual policies (which emphasize output stabilization), and consistent with the fact that the
concept of potential output used here, while necessary to construct any measure of the output
gap, cannot be observed by the policymaker.30
Combining (4.4) with equilibrium conditions (4.1) and (4.2), we can derive the following
closed-form expression for equilibrium output:




κ (φπ − ρa)
(1 − βρa)[σ−1(1 − ρa)+φy]+κ(φπ − ρa)
Notice that under the (weak) assumption that φπ > ρa,w eh a v e0 < Θ ≤ 1.T h ef a c tt h a t
Θ > 0 guarantees that a positive (negative) technology shock raises (lowers) output, as in the
30Throughout we assume that the condition κ(φπ − 1) + (1 − β)φy > 0 is satisﬁed. As shown by Bullar and
Mitra (2002) that condition is necessary to guarantee a unique equilibrium.
32standard RBC model. On the other hand, Θ ≤ 1 implies that
ψy ≤ ψy
i.e., in the presence of nominal frictions the size of response of output to a technology shock, ψy,
is bounded above by that implied by the corresponding RBC model (ψy)w h e nt h ec e n t r a lb a n k
follows rule (4.4). Hence, the combination of sticky prices and a Taylor rule will tend to over-
stabilize the output ﬂuctuation resulting from technology shocks. We can interpret parameter
Θ as an index of eﬀective policy accommodation, i.e. one that measures the extent to which
Taylor rule (4.4) accommodates the changes in potential output resulting from variations in
technology shocks, given the persistence of the latter and the rest of parameters describing the
economy. Notice that the index of eﬀective policy accommodation Θ is increasing in the size of
the inﬂation coeﬃcient in the Taylor rule (φπ) ,a n di nt h ee ﬀectiveness of interest changes (as
reﬂected by σ). It is also positively related to κ (and, hence, inversely related to the degree of
price stickiness). On the other hand, it is inversely related to the size of the output coeﬃcient
in the Taylor rule (φy).









Notice that, in a way analogous to the output case, we have ψn ≤ ψn. In other words, the
size of the employment response to a (positive) technology shock in the presence of nominal
frictions is bounded above by the size of the response generated by the underlying frictionless
RBC model. Furthermore, it is clear that the impact of a technology shock on employment may
33be positive or negative, depending on the conﬁguration of parameter values.
We can get a sense for the likely sign and plausible magnitude for ψn by using conventional
values used in calibration exercises in the literature involving similar models. Thus, Rotemberg
and Woodford’s (1999) estimates based on the response to monetary policy shocks, imply a
value of 0.024 for κ. A unit value is often used as an upper bound for σ. Taylor’s widely used
values for φπ and φy are 1.5 and 0.5, respectively. In standard RBC calibrations the assumption
ρa =0 .95 is often made. Finally we can set β =0 .99 and α = 1
3, two values that are not much
controversial. Under those assumptions, we obtain a value for Θ of 0.28.T h el a t t e rﬁgure points
to a relatively low degree of eﬀective policy accommodation.
Using a standard calibrated RBC model, Campbell (1994) obtains a range of values for ψy
between 1 and 2.7, depending on the persistence of the shock and the elasticity of labor supply.
In particular, given a unit labor supply elasticity and a 0.95 autocorrelation in the technology
process, he obtains an elasticity ψy of 1.45 , which we adopt as our benchmark value.31 When we
combine the latter with our calibrated value for Θ computed, we obtain an implied benchmark
elasticity of employment ψn equal to −0.87.
The previous calibration exercise, while admittedly quick and loose, illustrates that condi-
tion ψn < 0 is likely to hold under a broad range of reasonable parameter values. Under those
circumstances, and subject to the caveat implied by the simplicity of the model and the charac-
terization of monetary policy, it is hard to interpret the negative comovement between output
and employment observed in the data as a puzzle, as it has often been done.32
In his seminal paper, Prescott (1986) concluded his description of the predictions of the RBC
paradigm by stating: “In other words [RBC] theory predicts what is observed. Indeed, if the
31This corresponds to the impact elasticity with respect to productivity, and ignores subsequent adjustment
of capital (which is very small). The source is Table 3 in Campbell (1994), with an appropriate adjustment
to correct for his (labor-augmenting) speciﬁcation of techology in the production function (we need to divide
Campbell’s number by 2/3).
32Interestingly, a similar result can be uncovered in an unpublished paper by McGrattan (1999). Unfortunately
the author did not seem to notice that ﬁnding (or, at least, she did not discuss it explicitly).
34economy did not display the business cycle phenomena, there would be a puzzle.” In light of
the analysis above, perhaps we should think of turning Prescott’s dictum over its head, and
argue instead that if as a result of technology variations the economy did indeed display the
typical positive comovement between output and employment that characterizes the business
cycle, then there would be a puzzle!
4.1.2. Nominal Rigidities and the Eﬀects of Investment-Speciﬁc Technology Shocks
Interestingly, the logic behind the impact of nominal rigidities on the eﬀects of conventional
aggregate, sector neutral technology shocks on which the previous discussion focuses, would also
seem consistent with the estimated eﬀects of investment-speciﬁc technology shocks, as reported
in Fisher (2003) and further discussed in section 3 above. The argument can be made most
clearly in the context of a sticky price version of a model like that in GHK (2000) model. Once
again, let us for simplicity that the relationship yt = mt − pt holds in equilibrium, and that
both mt and pt are pre-determined relative to the shock. In that case ﬁrms will want to produce
the same quantity of the good but, in contrast with the case of neutral technology shocks, in
order to do so they will need to employ the same level of inputs since the eﬃciency of the latter
has not been aﬀected (only newly purchased capital goods will enhance that productivity in the
future). That property of I-shocks is illustrated in Smets and Wouters (2003a) in the context of
a much richer DSGE model. In particular, those authors show that even in the presence of the
substantial price and wage rigidities estimated for the U.S. economy a positive I-shock causes
output and labor input to increase simultaneously, in a way consistent with the Fisher (2003)
VAR evidence. In fact, as shown in Smets and Wouters (2003a) the qualitative pattern of the
joint response of output and hours to an I-shock is not aﬀected much when they simulate the
model with all nominal rigidities turned oﬀ.
354.1.3. Evidence on the Role of Nominal Rigidities
A number of recent papers have provided evidence, often indirect, on the possible role of nominal
rigidities as a source of the gap between the estimated responses of output and labor input
measures to a technology shock and the corresponding predictions of an RBC model. We brieﬂy
describe a sample of those papers next.
Models with nominal rigidities imply that the response of the economy to a technology shock
(or to any other shock, for that matter) will generally depend on the endogenous response of
the monetary authority, and should thus not be invariant to the monetary policy regime in
place. Galí, López-Salido, and Vallés (2003; henceforth, GLV) exploit that implication, and try
to uncover any diﬀerences in the estimated response to an identiﬁed technology shock across
subsample periods. Building on the literature that points to signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the conduct
of monetary policy between the pre-Volcker and the Volcker-Greenspan periods, they estimate
a four-variable structural VAR with a long run restriction as in Galí (1999) for each of those
subsample periods. Their evidence points to signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the estimated responses to
a technology shock. In particular, they show that the decline in hours in response to a positive
technology shock in much more pronounced in the pre-Volcker period, being hardly signiﬁcant
in the Volcker-Greenspan. That evidence is consistent with the idea that monetary policy in
the latter period has focused more on the stabilization of inﬂation, an not so much on the
stabilization of economic activity.33
Some evidence at the micro-level is provided by Marchetti and Nucci (2004), who exploit a
detailed data set containing information on output, inputs and price-setting practices for a large
panel of Italian manufacturing ﬁr m s .U s i n gam o d i ﬁed Solow residual approach they construct
33The analysis in GLV (2003) has been extended by Francis, Owyang, and Theodorou (2004) to other G7
countries. They uncover substantial diﬀerences across countries in the joint response of employment, prices and
interest rates to technology shocks, and argue that some of those diﬀerences can be grounded in diﬀerences in
the underlying interest rate rules.
36a time series for total factor productivity at the ﬁrm level, and estimate the responses of a
number of ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables to an innovation in the corresponding technology measure.
Among other ﬁndings, they provide evidence of a negative impact eﬀect of a technology shock
on labor input. Most interestingly, Marchetti and Nucci also exploit ﬁrm-speciﬁc information
regarding the frequency of price adjustments. They split the sample of ﬁrms according to the
frequency of their price revisions: “ﬂexible” price ﬁrms (adjust prices every three months or
more often) and “sticky” price ﬁr m s( a d j u s t i n ge v e r ys i xm o n t h so rl e s so f t e n ) .T h e yﬁnd that
the negative response of employment to a positive technology shock is larger (and signiﬁcant) in
t h ec a s eo f“ s t i c k y ”p r i c eﬁrms, and much weaker (and statistically insigniﬁcant) for “ﬂexible”
price ﬁrms. That evidence suggests that nominal rigidities may be one of the factors underlying
the estimated eﬀects of technology shocks.34
4.2. Real Explanations
Several authors have proposed explanations for the evidence described in Section 2 that do
not rely on the presence of nominal rigidities. Such “real” explanations generally involve some
modiﬁcation of the standard RBC model. Next we brieﬂy describe some of those explanations.
Francis and Ramey (2003a) propose two modiﬁcations of an otherwise standard RBC model
that can potentially account for the negative comovement of output and hours in response to
a technology shock. The ﬁrst model incorporates habit formation in consumption and capital
adjustment costs. As shown in Francis and Ramey a calibrated version of that model can
account for many of the estimated eﬀects of technology shocks. In particular, the response to a
permanent improvement in technology of consumption, investment and output is more sluggish
than in the standard model with no habits or capital adjustment costs. If that dampening eﬀect
34A less favorable assessment is found in Chang and Hong (2003), who conduct a similar exercise using four-
digit U.S. manufacturing industries, and relying on evidence of sectoral nominal rigidities based on the work of
Bils and Klenow () Weak evidence of contractionary eﬀects and correlation with measures of price stickiness]
37is suﬃciently strong, the increase in output may be smaller than the increase in productivity
itself, thus causing a reduction in hours. The latter decline is consistent with the optimal
decision of households to consume more leisure (despite the higher wage) as a consequence of
a dominant income eﬀect.35A similar mechanism underlies the modiﬁcation of the basic RBC
model proposed by Wen (2001), who assumes a utility function with a subsistence level of
consumption (equivalent to a constant habit).
The second modiﬁcation of the RBC model proposed by Francis and Ramey (2003a) hinges on
the assumption of no substitutability between labor and capital in production. In that context
the only way to increase output in the short run is by increasing the workweek of capital.
Furthermore, hours beyond the standard workweek generate additional disutility. In such a
model a permanent increase in labor-augmenting technology is shown to generate a short run
decline in hours. The intuition is simple, and in the ﬁnal analysis not much diﬀerent from other
modiﬁcations proposed. While output increases in the short run (due to increased investment
opportunities), that increase is not suﬃcient to compensate for the fact that any quantity of
output can now be produced with less employment (per shift) and a shorter workweek.
Rotemberg (2003) develops a version of the RBC model in which technological change diﬀuses
much more slowly than implied by conventional speciﬁcations found in the RBC literature. The
rate at which technology is adopted is calibrated on the basis of the micro studies on speed of
diﬀusion. Rotemberg shows that when the smooth technology process is embedded in the RBC
model it generates small short run ﬂuctuations in output and employment, which are largely
unrelated to the cyclical variations associated with detrended measured of employment and
output. In particular, a positive innovation to technology that diﬀuses very slowly generates a
very large wealth eﬀect (relative to the size of the innovation) which in turn leads households the
35See Lettau and Uhlig (2000) for a detailed analysis of the properties of an RBC model with habit formation.
As pointed out by Francis and Ramey, Lettau and Uhlig seem to dismiss the assumption of habits on the grounds
that it yields “counterfactual cyclical behavior.”
38increase their consumption of leisure. As a result, both hours and output experience a short run
decline in response to a technology shock of a typical size, before they gradually increase above
their initial levels. Because those responses are so smooth, they imply very small movements at
cyclical frequencies. It follows that technology shocks with such characteristics will only account
for a small fraction of observed cyclical ﬂuctuations in output and hours.
Collard and Dellas (2002) emphasize an additional mechanism, speciﬁct oa no p e ne c o n o m y ,
through which technology shocks may induce short run negative comovements between output
and labor input even in the absence of nominal rigidities. They analyze a two-country RBC
model with imperfect substitutability between domestic and foreign consumption goods. If that
substitutability is suﬃciently low, a positive technology shock in the home country triggers
a large deterioration in its terms of trade (i.e, a large decline in the price of domestic goods
relative to foreign goods). That change in relative prices may induce households to increase
their consumption of leisure at any given product wage, thus contracting labor supply and
lowering hours. The quantitative analysis of a calibrated version of their model suggests that
while technology shocks may be a non-negligible source of output ﬂuctuations its role is likely
to be very small as a driving force behind hours ﬂuctuations.
The papers discussed in this section provide examples of model economies which can account
for the evidence regarding the eﬀects of technology shocks without relying on any nominal
frictions. On the basis of that evidence it is not possible to sort out the relative role played
by “nominal” and “real” frictions in accounting for the evidence. The reason is simple: there
is no clear mapping between the estimated coeﬃcients in a structural VAR and the underlying
structural parameters which determine the degree of those frictions. As a result estimated VARs
cannot serve as the basis of the sort of counterfactual simulations that would allow us to uncover
the implied eﬀects of technology shocks if either “nominal” or “real” frictions were not present.
Such counterfactual exercises require the use of an estimated structural model. In the next
39section we turn our attention to one such model.
5. Technology Shocks and the Business Cycle in an Estimated DSGE
Model
In the present section we try to sort out the merits of the two types of explanations discussed
above by estimating and analyzing a framework that incorporates both types of frictions, and
which is suﬃciently rich to be taken to the data. The features that we incorporate include habit
formation in consumption, staggered price and wage-setting a la Calvo, ﬂexible indexation of
wages and prices to lagged inﬂation, and a monetary policy rule of the Taylor type with interest
rate smoothing.
Several examples of estimated general equilibrium models can be found in the literature. Our
framework is most closely related to the one used in Rabanal (2003), with two main diﬀerences.
First, we allow for a unit root in the technology process in a way consistent with the assumptions
underlying the identiﬁcation strategy pursued in section 2. Second, we ignore the cost channel
mechanism allowed for in Rabanal (2003), in light of the evidence in that paper suggesting an
insigniﬁcant role for that mechanism.
We estimate the parameters of the model using Bayesian methods, and focus our analysis
on the implications of the estimated model regarding the eﬀects of technology shocks and the
contribution of the latter to the business cycle. The use of a structural estimated model allows
us to determine, by means of counterfactual simulations, the role played by diﬀerent factors
in accounting for the estimated eﬀects of technology shocks. Last but not least, the estimated
model gives us an indication of the nature of the shocks that have played a dominant role as a
source of postwar business cycles.
The use of Bayesian methods to estimate DSGE models has increased over the recent years,
40in a variety of contexts.36 Fernández-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramírez (2004) show that parameter
estimation is consistent in the Bayesian framework even under model misspeciﬁcation. Smets
and Wouters (2003a, 2003b) estimate a model with capital accumulation, and both nominal and
real rigidities for the euro area and the U.S.. Lubik and Schorfheide (2003) use the Bayesian
framework to estimate a small scale model allowing for indeterminacy. Rabanal (2003) estimates
a general equilibrium model for the United States and the euro area in search for cost channel
eﬀects of monetary policy.37
Next we summarize the set of equilibrium conditions of the model.38 T h ed e m a n ds i d eo f
the model is represented by the Euler-like equation
b ∆yt = Et{∆yt+1} − (1 − b)( rt − Et{πt+1})+( 1− ρg)(1 − b) gt (5.1)
which modiﬁes equation (4.1) above by allowing for some external habit formation (indexed
by parameter b), an introducing a preference shock {gt},t h a tf o l l o w sa nA R ( 1 )p r o c e s sw i t h
coeﬃcient ρg. Underlying (5.1) there is an assumption that preferences are separable between
consumption and hours, and logarithmic in the quasidiﬀerence of consumption in order to pre-
serve the balanced growth path property.39 Aggregate output and hours are related by the
simple log-linear production function
yt = at + nt
36However, the existing literature on estimating general equiilibrium models using Bayesian methods assumes
that all shocks are stationary, even when highly correlated. A novelty of this paper is that we introduce a
permanent technology shock. Ireland (2004) estimates a general equilibrium model with permanent technology
shocks, using maximum likelihood.
37As o m e w h a td i ﬀerent estimation strategy is the one followed by Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2003),
Altig et al. (2003) and Bovin and Giannoni (2003), who estimate general equilibrium models by matching model’s
implied impulse-response functions to the estimated ones.
38Details can be found in an appendix available from the authors upon request.








1+ϕ ]. subject to a usual budget constraint. The preference shock evolves,
expressed in logs, as:
gt =( 1− ρg) ¯ G + ρg gt−1 + ε
g
t.
41Equivalently, and using a tilde to denote variables normalized by current productivity (in
order to induce stationarity), we have
˜ yt = nt (5.2)
Log-linearization of the optimal price-setting condition around the zero inﬂation steady state
yields an equation describing the dynamics of inﬂation as a function of the deviations of the
average (log) markup from its steady state level, which we denote by µ
p
t.40
πt = γb πt−1 + γf Et{πt+1} − κp (µ
p







θp(1+ηpβ) , θp is the probability of not adjusting prices








≡− ˜ ωt is the price markup, where ˜ ωt = ωt − at is the real wage per
eﬃciency unit. Variable ut denotes exogenous variations in the desired price markup.
Log-linearization the optimal wage-setting condition yields the following equation for the




























where θw denotes the fraction of workers that do not re-optimize their wage, ηw ∈ [0,1] is the
degree of wage indexation to lagged inﬂation, and where κw ≡
(1−θw)(1−βθw)
θw(1+²wϕ) ,w h e r e²w is the
wage elasticity of labor demand in the steady state. Also notice that µw
t ≡ ˜ ωt − ( 1
1−b˜ yt −
b
1−b˜ yt−1 −gt + b
1−b∆at +ϕnt) is the wage markup. Variable vt denotes exogenous variations in
the desired wage markup.
40See Smets and Wouters (2003a) for a derivation of the price and wage setting equations.
42Finally, we close the model by assuming that the monetary authority adjusts interest rates
in response to changes in inﬂation and output growth according to the rule:
rt = φr rt−1 +( 1− φr)φπ πt +( 1− φr)φy ∆yt + zt (5.5)
where zt is an exogenous monetary shock.41
The exogenous driving variables are assumed to evolve as follows:
at = at−1 + εa
t
gt = ρg gt−1 + ε
g
t
ut = ρu ut−1 + εu
t




Notice that while we do not observe ˜ ωt and ˜ yt, the two variables are related as follows:
ωt − yt =˜ ωt − ˜ yt
and ωt − yt is an observable variable, which should be stationary in equilibrium. In the next
section, we explain how to write the likelihood function in terms of the ﬁve observable variables:
output growth, inﬂation, the nominal interest rate, hours, and the real wage-output ratio.
41Following Erceg and Levin (2003), we assume that the Federal Reserve reacts to output growth rather than
the output gap. An advantage of following such a rule, as Orphanides and Williams (2002) stress, is that
mismeasurement of the level of potential output does not aﬀect the conduct of monetary policy (as opposed to
using some measure of detrended output to estimate the output gap).
435.1. Parameter Estimation
5.1.1. Data
We estimate the model laid out in the previous section using U.S. quarterly time series for ﬁve
variables: real output, inﬂation, real wages, hours and interest rates. The sample period is 1948:1
to 2002:4. For consistence with the analysis in section 2, we use the same series for output and
hours. Our measure of nominal wages is the compensation per hour in the nonfarm business
sector (LXNFC), and the measure for the price level is the nonfarm business sector deﬂator
(LXNFI). Finally, we use the quarterly average daily readings of the 3-month T-bill (FTB3) as
the relevant nominal interest rate. In order to render the series stationary we detrend hours and
the real wage-output ratio using a quadratic trend. We treat inﬂation, output growth and the
nominal interest rate as stationary, and express them in deviations from their sample mean.
As is well known from Bayes’ rule, the posterior distribution of the parameters is proportional
to the product of the prior distribution of the parameters and the likelihood function of the
data. Until recently, only well known and standard distributions could be used. The advent
of fast computer processors and Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods has removed
this restriction, and a more general class of models and distributions can be used.42 In order
to implement the Bayesian estimation method, we need to be able to evaluate numerically the
prior and the likelihood function. Then, we use the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm to obtain
random draws from the posterior distribution, from which we obtain the relevant moments of
the posterior distribution of the parameters.
5.1.2. The Likelihood Function
Let ψ denote the vector of parameters that describe preferences, technology, the monetary policy
rule and the shocks of the model, dt be the vector of endogenous variables (observable or not),
42See Fernández-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramírez (2004).
44zt be the vector of shocks, and εt be the vector of innovations.
The system of equilibrium conditions and the process for the exogenous shocks can be written
as a second order diﬀerence equation
A(ψ) Et{dt+1} = B (ψ) dt + C (ψ) dt−1 + D(ψ) zt,
zt = N (ψ) zt−1 + εt,E (εtε0
t)=Σ(ψ).
We use standard solution methods for linear models with rational expectations (see, e.g.,
Uhlig, (1999)) to write the law of motion in state-space form and the Kalman ﬁlter, as in
Hamilton (1994) to evaluate the likelihood of the ﬁve observable variables xt =[ rt,πt,ωt −










In this section, we denote by Π(ψ) the prior distribution of the parameters. We present the list of
the structural parameters and its associated prior distributions in the ﬁrst three columns of Table
4. Most of the priors involve uniform distributions for the parameters, which simply restrict the
support. We use uniform distributions for the parameter that explains habit formation, for the
probabilities of the Calvo lotteries, and for the indexation parameters. The prior for all these
parameters has support between 0 and 1, except the probabilities of the Calvo lottery, which
are allowed to take values up to 0.9, i.e., we are ruling out average price and wage durations of
more than 10 quarters.
We try to supplement as much prior information as possible for the model’s exogenous
shocks. The AR(1) coeﬃcients have uniform prior distributions between 0 and 0.97.G a m m a
distributions for the standard deviations of the shocks are assumed, to guarantee non-negativity.
We select their hyperparameters to match available information for the prior mean standard
deviation of the innovations, while allowing reasonable uncertainty in this parameters. For
45instance, for the monetary policy rule we choose the means of the inﬂation and output growth
coeﬃcients to match the ones proposed by Taylor.43 For the monetary policy shock, we use the
standard deviation that comes from running an OLS regression for the Taylor rule equation.
In addition, we ﬁx some parameters. The discount factor, we set at β =0 .99. The elasticities
of product and labor demand are set to 6 (which implying steady state markups of 20 percent).
These values are pretty conventional in the literature.
5.1.4. Drawing from the Posterior






The posterior density function is proportional to the product of the likelihood function and
the prior joint density function of ψ. Given our priors and the likelihood functions implied by
the state-space solution to the model, we are not able to obtain a closed-form solution for the
posterior distributions. However, we are able to evaluate both expressions numerically. We
follow Fernández-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramírez (2004) and Lubik and Schorfheide (2003) and







. We use the draw to estimate the moments of the posterior distribution,
and to obtain impulse responses and second moments of the endogenous variables.
43If a random draw of the parameters is such that the model does not deliver a unique and stable solution,
we assign a zero likelihood value, which implies that the posterior density will be zero as well. See, Lubik and
Schorfheide (2003) for a estimated DSGE model allowing for indeterminacy.
465.2. Main Findings
5.2.1. Parameter Estimates and Second Moments
The last two columns of Table 4 report the mean and standard deviation of the posterior
distributions for all the parameters. Notice that the habit formation parameter is estimated
to be 0.42, a value somewhat smaller than that suggested by Christiano, Eichenbaum and
Evans (2003) or Smets and Wouters (2003b). The parameter that measures the elasticity of the
marginal disutility of hours, ϕ,i se s t i m a t e dt ob e0.80, which is close to values usually obtained
or calibrated in the literature.
The average duration of price contracts implied by the point estimate of the price stickiness
parameter lies slightly above two quarters. We view this estimate as a “moderate” amount of
price stickiness in the economy. Perhaps most surprising is the low degree of wage stickiness
uncovered by our estimation method. Such an implausible low estimate may suggest that the
Calvo model is not the best formalism to characterize wage dynamics.44
The price indexation coeﬃcient is estimated at a low value, 0.04, suggesting that the pure
forward looking model is a good approximation to inﬂation dynamics, once we allow for autore-
gressive price mark up shocks. On the other hand, indexation in wage setting is more important,
with a posterior mean of 0.42.T h ec o e ﬃcients of the interest rate rule suggest a high degree of
interest rate smoothing, 0.69, a small response of the interest rate to output growth ﬂuctuations,
and a coeﬃcient of the response of the interest rate to inﬂation of 1.33, which corresponds to a
“lean against the wind” monetary policy. The estimated processes for the shocks of the model
suggest that all of them are highly autocorrelated, with parameters between 0.95 for the price
markup shock to 0.91 for the wage markup shock.45
44Rabanal (2003) ﬁnds a similar result for an estimated DSGE model that is only slightly diﬀerent from the
one used here.
45We have also conducted some subsample stability analysis, splitting the sample into pre-Volcker years and
the Volcker-Greenspan era. While there were some small diﬀerences in estimated parameters across samples,
none of the main conclusions of this section were aﬀected.
47Table 5 displays some selected posterior second moments implied by the model estimates,
and compare them to the data.46 The ﬁrst two columns present the standard deviation of the
observed variables, and their counterparts implied by the estimated model. We can see that
the model does a very good job in replicating the standard deviations of output, inﬂation and
the nominal interest rate. The model also does well in mimicking the unconditional correlation
between the growth rates of hours and output: in the data it is 0.75, and in the model it is
0.72. However, it overestimates the standard deviation of hours (3.11 percent in the data and
4.6 percent in the model) and to a lesser extent the real wage-to-output ratio (3.69 percent in
the data, 4.44 percent in the model)
5.2.2. The Eﬀects of Technology Shocks
Next we turn our attention to the estimated model’s predictions regarding the eﬀects of tech-
nology shocks.47 Figure 7 displays the posterior impulse responses to a permanent technology
shock of size normalized to one standard deviation.48 We can observe that the model replicates
the VAR-based evidence fairly well, in spite of the diﬀerences in the approach. In particular
the estimated model implies a persistent decline in hours in response to a positive technology
shock, and a gradual adjustment of output to a permanently higher plateau. It takes about
four quarters for output to reach its new steady state level. Hours drop on impact by about 0.4
percentage points, and converge monotonically to their initial level afterwards.49
The third column of Table 5 reports the second moments of the observed variables conditional
on technology shocks being the only driving force. The fourth column shows the fraction of the
46These second moments where obtained using a sample of 10,000 draws from the 500,000 that were previously
obtained with the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm.
47A related analysis has been carried out independently by Smets and Wouters (2003b), albeit in the context
of a slightly diﬀerent DSGE model.
48The posterior mean and standard deviations are based on the same sample that was used to obtain the
second moments.
49A similar pattern of responses of output and hours to a technology shock can be found in Smets and Wouters
(2003b).
48variance of each variable accounted for by the technology shock.50 We can see that technology
shocks do not play a major role in explaining the variability of the ﬁve observed variables.
They explain 22 percent of the variability of output growth, and 6 percent of the variability
of inﬂation. For the rest of variables, including hours, they explain an insigniﬁcant amount
of overall volatility. A key result emerges when we simulate the model with technology shocks
only: we obtain a correlation between (∆yt,∆nt) of −0.49, which contrasts with the high positive
correlation between the same variables observed in the data.
The last three rows of Table 5 report statistics based on band-pass ﬁltered data. In this
case, the series of output growth and hours generated by the estimated model (when all shocks
other than technology are turned oﬀ) are used to obtain the (log) levels of hours and output,
on which the band-pass ﬁlter is applied. Once again we ﬁnd that technology shocks can only
account for a small fraction of the variance of the business cycle component of output and hours.
The conditional correlation between those two variables falls to −0.14,f r o mav a l u eo f0.88 for
the actual ﬁltered series.
The previous ﬁndings are illustrated graphically in Figure 7, which displays the business
cycle components of log output and log hours associated with technology shocks, according to
our estimated model. It is apparent that technology shocks only explain a minor fraction of
output ﬂuctuations. This is even more dramatic when we look at ﬂuctuations in hours, in a way
consistent with most of the VAR ﬁndings. Similar qualitative ﬁndings are found in Altig et al.
(2003), Ireland (2003) and Smets and Wouters (2003b), using slightly diﬀerent models and/or
estimation methods.
50We use the method of Ingram, Kocherlakota and Savin (1994) to recover the structural shocks. This method
is a particular case of using the Kalman ﬁlter to recover the structural shocks. We assume that the economy is
at its steady state value in the ﬁrst observation, rather than assuming a diﬀuse prior. By construction, the full
set of shocks replicate perfectly the features of the model.
495.2.3. What are the Main Sources of Economic Fluctuations?
Which shocks play a more important role in explaining ﬂuctuations in our observed variables?
In Table 6 we report the contribution of each shock to the total variance of each variable implied
by our model estimates. The shock that explains most of the variance of all variables in our
framework is the preference shock, which we can interpret more broadly as a (real) demand
shock. It explains above 70 percent of the variance of hours, the real wage-output ratio, and
the nominal interest rate. The preference shock also explains 57 percent of the variance of
output, and 36 percent of the variance of inﬂation. On the other hand, the monetary shock
only explains approximately 5 percent of output growth and the nominal interest rate, and is
an important determinant of inﬂation variability, contributing to 27 percent of total volatility.
Price and wage mark up shocks both have some importance in explaining the volatility of all
variables, with contributions to the variance that range from 7 percent to 17 percent. Overall,
the picture that emerges from Table 8 is that preference shocks are key to explain the volatility
of all variables. The monetary and technology shocks have some importance in the sense that
they explain about 20 percent of the variance in one of the variables (output growth in the case
of technology, inﬂation in the case of monetary shocks), but their contribution to the remaining
variables is very small. The price and wage markup shocks explain a small fraction of variability
in all variables.
5.2.4. Structural Explanations for the Estimated Eﬀects of Technology Shocks
Finally, we examine which features of the model are driving the negative comovement between
hours and output in response to technology shocks. In Table 7 we present the correlation between
the business cycle components of output and hours that arises under several counterfactual
scenarios. For each scenario we shut down some of the rigidities of the model and simulate it
again while keeping the same value for the remaining parameter estimates.
50Three features of the model stand out as natural candidates to explain the negative correla-
tion between output and hours: sticky prices, sticky wages, and habit formation. When we shut
down each of those of those we ﬁnd that the remaining rigidities still induce a large and negative
conditional correlation. For instance, in the second row we can see that assuming ﬂexible wages
(θw = ηw =0 ) delivers basically the same correlations. This result is not surprising given that
nominal wage rigidities do not appear to be important given the parameter estimates. When we
assume ﬂexible prices but keep sticky wages and habit formation, things do not change much
either.
A particular scenario would seem to be of special interest: one with ﬂexible prices and wages,
and habit formation. In that case, once again, a similar pattern of correlations emerges. A similar
result is obtained by Smets and Wouters (2003b), who interpret it as evidence favorable to some
of the real explanations found in the literature. Yet, when we turn oﬀ habit formation in our
estimated model but keep nominal rigidities operative we ﬁnd a qualitatively similar result: the
conditional and unconditional correlations between hours and output have the same pattern of
signs as that observed in the data. It is only when we shut down all rigidities (nominal and
real) that we obtain a positive correlation between hours and output, both conditionally and
unconditionally, and in a way consistent with the predictions of the basic RBC model.
Finally, we consider a calibration in which the central bank responds exclusively to inﬂation
changes, but not to output. Some authors have argued that the negative comovement of output
and hours may be a consequence of an attempt by the monetary authority to overstabilize output.
Our results suggest that this cannot be an overriding factor: when we set the coeﬃcient on output
growth equal to zero (but keeping both habit formation and nominal rigidities operative) we
still obtain a negative conditional correlation between hours and output.
In light of the previous ﬁndings we conclude that both real rigidities (habit formation, in our
model) and nominal rigidities (mostly sticky prices) appear to be relevant factors in accounting
51for the evidence on the eﬀects of technology shocks. Interestingly, and by way of contrast, both
nominal and real rigidities seem to be required in order to account for the empirical eﬀects of
monetary policy shocks (see e.g. Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999)) or the dynamics of
inﬂation (e.g., Galí and Gertler (1999)).
6. Conclusions
In the present paper we have reviewed recent research eﬀorts that seek to identify and estimate
the role of technology as a source of economic ﬂuctuations in ways that go beyond the simple
unconditional second moment matching exercises found in the early RBC literature. The number
of qualiﬁcations and caveats of any empirical exercise that seeks to provide an answer to the
above questions is never small. Furthermore, and as is often the case in empirical research in
economics, the evidence does not speak with a single voice, even when similar methods and
data sets are used. Those caveats notwithstanding, the bulk of the evidence reported in the
present paper raises serious doubts about the importance of changes in aggregate technology
as a signiﬁcant (or, even more, a dominant) force behind business cycles, in contrast with the
original claims of the RBC literature. Instead it points to demand factors as the main force
behind the strong positive comovement between output and labor input measures that is the
hallmark of the business cycle.
7. Addendum: A Response to Ellen McGrattan
In her comments to the present paper, Ellen McGrattan (2004) dismisses the evidence on the
eﬀects of technology shocks based on structural VARs that rely on long-run identifying restric-
tions (SVARs). The purpose of this addendum is to explain why we think McGrattan’s analysis
and conclusions are misleading. Since some of her argument and the evidence she provides is
based on her recent working paper with Chari and Kehoe, our discussion often refers directly to
52that paper (Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2004); CKM, henceforth).
Our main point is easy to summarize. McGrattan and CKM study a number of model
economies, all of which predict that hours should rise in response to a positive technology
shock. Yet, when they estimate a SVAR on data generated by those models, the resulting
impulse responses show a decline in hours in response to such a shock (with one exception to
be discussed below).
McGrattan presents her ﬁndings and those in CKM as an illustration of a general ﬂaw with
SVARs. But we ﬁnd that conclusion unwarranted. What McGrattan and CKM really show is
that a misidentiﬁed and/or misspeciﬁed SVAR often leads to incorrect inference. As McGrattan
herself acknowledges, in her example of a “standard” RBC model (as well as in all but one of the
examples in CKM) the assumptions underlying the data generating model are inconsistent with
the identifying assumption in the VAR: either technology is stationary, or non-technology shocks
have a permanent eﬀect on productivity, or the order of integration of hours is wrong.51 In those
cases the ﬁnding of incorrect inference is neither surprising nor novel, since it restates points that
have already been made in the literature.52 Furthermore, that conclusion should be contrasted
with that of Erceg, Guerrieri, and Gust (2004; EGG, henceforth), who show that when the
SVAR is correctly speciﬁed and the identifying restrictions are satisﬁed by the underlying data
generating models, the estimated responses to technology shocks match (at least qualitatively)
the theoretical ones.
We think that, when properly used, SVARs provide an extremely useful guide for developing
business cycle theories. Evidence on the eﬀects of particular shocks that is shown to be robust to
a variety of plausible identiﬁcation schemes should not be ignored when developing and reﬁning
DSGE models that will be used for policy analysis. On the one hand, that requirement imposes
51In the one case where the VAR is identiﬁed correctly, it yields the correct qualitative responses, though with
some quantitative bias resulting from the inability to cature the true dynamics with a low order VAR. This result
has been shown in Erceg, Guerrieri, and Gust (2004).
52See Cooley and Dwyer (1998) and Christiano el al. (2003), among others.
53a stronger discipline on model builders than just matching the patterns of unconditional second
moments of some time series of interest, the approach traditionally favored by RBC economists.
On the other hand, it allows one to assess the relevance of alternative speciﬁcations without
knowledge of all the driving forces impinging on the economy.53
Another ﬁnding in CKM that may seem striking to many readers is that their business
accounting framework produces a rise in hours in response to a positive technology shock, in
contrast with the evidence summarized in section 2 of the present paper. Below, we conjecture
that such a result hinges critically on treating the conventional Solow residual as an appropriate
measure of technology, in contrast to the wealth of evidence suggesting the presence of signiﬁcant
procyclical error in that measure of technology. By way of contrast, most of the SVAR-based
ﬁndings on the eﬀects of technology shocks overviewed in the present paper rely on identifying
assumptions that are much weaker than those required for the Solow residual to be a suitable
measure of technology.
Next we elaborate on the previous points, as well as on other issues raised by McGrattan’s
comment. First, we try to shed some light on why the estimated SVARs do not recover the
model-generated impulse responses. Second, we provide a conjecture as to why CKM’s estimated
model would predict an increase in hours in response to a positive technology shock, even if the
opposite were to be true. Finally, we comment on CKM’s proposed alternative to SVARs.
7.1. Why Does the SVAR Evidence Fail to Match the McGrattan and CKM Models’
Predictions?
The reason why the SVAR estimates reported by McGrattan fail to recover the joint response
of output and hours implied by her RBC model should not be viewed as reﬂecting an inherent
ﬂaw in the SVAR approach. Instead it is most likely a consequence of misspeciﬁcation and
53See Christiano et al. (2003) for an illustration of the usefulness of that approach.
54misidentiﬁcation of the SVAR used.
First, and most ﬂagrantly, the “geometric growth” speciﬁcation of technology assumed in
the McGrattan exercise implies that technology shocks will only have temporary eﬀects on labor
productivity. A maintained assumption in Galí (1999) and in section 2.1 above, is the existence
of a unit root in the technology process, underlying the observed unit root in productivity. It is
clear that if a researcher holds an inherent belief in the stationarity of technology she will not
want to use that empirical approach to estimate the eﬀects of technology shocks. We ﬁnd the
notion that technology shocks don’t have permanent eﬀects hard to believe, though cannot oﬀer
any proof (though we have provided suggestive evidence along those lines in section 3.1). In any
event, we ﬁnd it useful to point out that the literature contains several examples, reviewed in
section 2, which do not rely on the unit root assumption, and which yield results similar to Galí
(1999).54
In principle, CKM appear to overcome the previous misidentiﬁcation problem by using as a
data generating mechanism an RBC model which assumes a “unit root” in technology. They
consider two versions of that model (“preferred” and “baseline”), which we discuss in turn.
Their “preferred” speciﬁcation fails to satisfy the identifying restriction of the VAR in another
important dimension: because of the endogeneity of technology in their model (reﬂected in the
non-zero oﬀ-diagonal terms in the process describing the driving forces), shocks that are non-
technological in nature are going to have an eﬀect on the level of technology and, hence, on
productivity. As a result, the identiﬁcation underlying the SVAR will be incorrect and inference
will be distorted.
The two misidentiﬁcation problems just discussed should not aﬀect the CKM “baseline” spec-
iﬁcation, for in the latter technology is assumed to follow an exogenous random walk process.
Yet, when we look at the properties of that model we uncover a misspeciﬁcation problem in
54See, e.g., BFK (1999), Francis et al. (2003), and Pesavento and Rossi (2004).
55the VAR used. In a nutshell, and as it it the case for most RBC models found in the litera-
ture, CKM’s baseline model implies that hours worked follow a stationary process, though they
estimate the SVAR using ﬁrst-diﬀerenced hours. The potential problems associated with that
misspeciﬁcation were originally pointed out by CEV (2003) and have been discussed extensively
in section 3 of the present paper.55
Interestingly, CKM provide one example (the “exception” we were referring to above) in
which the estimated SVAR satisﬁes both the key long-run identifying restriction (technology is
exogenous and contains a unit root) and is correctly speciﬁed (hours are introduced in levels). In
that case, and not surprisingly, the SVAR makes a correct inference: hours are estimated to rise
in response to a technology shock, as the model predicts. While CKM acknowledge that fact,
they instead focus on the ﬁnding that the estimated impulse response shows a non-negligible
bias. This is an interesting point, but it is not central to the controversy regarding the eﬀects
of technology shocks: the latter has focused all along on the estimated sign of the comovement
of output and hours, not on the size of the responses. Nor is it novel: it is one of the two main
ﬁndings in Erceg, Guerrieri and Gust (2003; EGG), who already point and analyze the role
played by the slow adjustment of capital in generating that downward bias.
Unfortunately, neither McGrattan nor CKM emphasize EGG’s second main ﬁnding, which
is highly relevant for their purposes: using both a standard RBC model and a new Keynesian
model with staggered wage and price setting as data generating mechanisms, they conclude that
the estimated responses to a technology shock using the same SVAR approach as in Galí (1999),
look like the true responses to that shock in both models, at least from a qualitative viewpoint
(leading to a rise in hours in the former case, and to a drop in the latter, in a way consistent
with the models’ predictions).
55CKM’s discussion of that problem is somewhat obscured by their reference to “the insuﬃcient number of
lags in the VAR”, as opposed to just stating that hours are over-diﬀerenced. See also Marcet (2004) for a more
general discussion of the consequences (or lack thereof) of overdiﬀerencing.
567.2. Why Does the CKM Accounting Framework Predict a Rise in Hours?
The framework used by McGrattan in section 2.2 of her comment is unlikely to be recognized by
most macroeconomists as a “standard RBC model,” the title of the subsection notwithstanding .
Instead, it consists of a version of the business cycle accounting framework originally developed in
Chari et al. (2004). That framework consists of a standard RBC model with four driving forces
(or “wedges,” in their terminology). One of those driving forces, which enters the production
function as a conventional productivity parameter, is interpreted as a technology shock. Two
other driving forces are broadly interpreted as a labor market and an investment wedge. The
fourth is government spending. After assuming functional forms for preferences and technology
as well as a conventional calibration of the associated parameters conventional in the RBC
literature, CKM estimate a VAR model for the four driving forces using time series for output,
hours, investment and government consumption.
Let us put aside some of the issues regarding the suitability of SVARs discussed in the
previous section to turn to a diﬀerent question: Why does the estimated CKM accounting
framework predict an increase in hours in response to a positive technology shock? The interest of
the question may be puzzling to some readers, for after all, the CKM model looks like a standard
RBC model augmented with many shocks. But that description is not accurate in a subtle,
but important dimension: the disturbances/wedges in the CKM accounting framework are not
orthogonal to each other, having instead a rich dynamic structure. Thus, nothing prevents, at
least in principle, some of the non-technology wedges from responding to a technology shock in
such a way as to generate a negative comovement between output and hours in response to that
shock. After all, the increase in markups following a positive technology shock is precisely the
mechanism through which a model with nominal rigidities can generate a decline in hours.
Here we can only speculate on the sources of the sign of the response of hours predicted
by the CKM model. But a cursory look at the structure of the model, and the approach to
57uncovering its shocks, points to a very likely candidate for that ﬁnding: the CKM measure of
the technology parameter corresponds to the gap between (log) GDP and a weighted average of
(log) capital and (log) hours, with the weights based on average income shares. In other words,
the CKM measure of technology corresponds for all practical purposes to the conventional Solow
(1957) residual. In adopting that approach to identiﬁcation of technology, CKM are brushing
aside two decades of research pointing to the multiple shortcomings of the Solow residual as a
measure of short run variations to technology, from Hall (1988) to BFK (1999). In the absence
of any adjustments for market power, variable utilization of inputs, and other considerations,
the Solow residual, as an index of technological change, is known to be ridden with a large (and
highly procyclical) measurement error.
To illustrate this consider an economy with a constant technology (and no capital) in which
output and (measured) hours are linked according to the following reduced form equilibrium
relationship:
yt = α nt
CKM’s index of technology zt would have been computed using the Solow formula as:
zt = yt − sn t
where s is the average labor income share. Under Solow’s original assumptions s = α.B u t
the existing literature provides a number of compelling reasons why in practice we will almost
surely have α >s . It follows that CKM’s technology index can be written as:
zt =( α − s) nt
thus implying a mechanical positive correlation between measured technology and hours.
The previous example is admittedly overstylized but we think it illustrates the point clearly.
58Thus, it should come as no surprise if the estimated responses of the diﬀerent wedges to inno-
vations in that error-ridden measure of technology were to be highly biased, and may indeed
resemble the responses to a demand disturbance. In fact, the use of VARs based on either long
run restrictions (as in Galí (1999)) or puriﬁed Solow residuals (as in BFK (1999), as well as the
approach to model calibration in Burnside and Eichenbaum (1996) was largely motivated by
that observation.
7.3. Some Agreement
We cannot conclude this addendum without expressing our agreement with CKM’s proposed
“alternative approach” to identiﬁcation and estimation of technology (and other shocks), based
on the speciﬁcation of a “state representation and a set of identifying assumptions that nests the
class of models of interest...” and which can be “conveniently estimated with Kalman ﬁltering”
techniques. But this is precisely the approach that we have pursued in section 5 of the present
paper, following the footsteps of a number authors referred to in that section (including the
second author of the present paper).
In her comment McGrattan criticizes the particular model that we choose to implement
that approach (which she refers to as the “triple-sticky” model) on the grounds that it abstracts
from capital accumulation. But our goal was not to develop a fully-ﬂedged model, encompassing
all relevant aspects of the economy, but just to provide an illustration of a potentially fruitful
approach to analyzing the role of diﬀerent frictions in shaping the estimated eﬀects of technology
shocks. Fortunately, other authors have provided a similar analysis using a richer structure that
includes endogenous capital accumulation, among many other features. The models used in that
literature allow (but do not impose) all sorts of frictions in a highly ﬂexible way, and nest the
standard RBC model as a particular case. Most importantly for our purposes here, some of those
papers (see, e.g., Smets and Wouters (2003b)) have analyzed explicitly the eﬀects of technology
59shocks implied by their estimated models. In a way consistent with our ﬁndings above, those
eﬀects have been shown to imply a negative response of hours to a positive technology shock.
Unfortunately McGrattan reports no comparable evidence for her “triple-sticky model with
investment,” though we conjecture that the latter would imply a similar response.
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TABLE 1.    
 
The Effects of Technology Shocks on Output and Hours   
 


















  Contribution to:  Conditional  Impact on n and y: 
 var(y)  var(n)  corr(y,n)  sign  significance 
          
Per Capita Hours     
   
     
   
Difference  0.07  0.05  -0.08  -  / +
  yes / yes 
         
Level  0.37  0.11  0.80  + / +  no / yes 
         
Detrended  0.07  0.05  -0.11  - / +  yes / yes 
         
         
Total Hours         
         
Difference  0.06  0.06  -0.03  - / +  yes / yes 
         
Level  0.10  0.36  0.80  - / -  yes / no 
         
Detrended  0.15  0.36  0.80  - / 0  yes / no 
         




TABLE 2.   
 
The Effects of Technology Shocks on GDP and Employment 
 
  Contribution to:  Conditional  Impact on n and y: 
 var(y)  var(n)  corr(y,n)  sign  significance 
          
Employment Rate     
   
     
   
Difference  0.31  0.04  0.40  -  / +
  yes / yes 
         
Level  0.03  0.19  -0.30  - / +  yes / no 
         
Detrended  0.15  0.04  -0.43  - / +  yes / yes 
         
         
Total Employment         
         
Difference  0.21  0.03  -0.40  - / +  yes / yes 
         
Level  0.09  0.08  -0.72  - / +  yes / yes 
         
Detrended  0.09  0.09  -0.68  - / +  yes / no 
         
         TABLE 3.   
 
Investment-Specific Technology Shocks: The Fisher Model 
 N-Shocks  I-Shocks 
  Contribution  to:  Contribution  to:   
  var(y) var(n)  corr(y,n) var(y) var(n) corr(y,n) 
         
Per Capita Hours         
         
Difference  0.06 0.06 -0.09 0.22 0.19  0.94 
Level  0.12 0.02 0.16 0.62 0.60  0.96 
Detrended  0.08 0.07 -0.03 0.10 0.09  0.94 
         
Total Hours          
         
Difference  0.07 0.06 0.05 0.16 0.14  0.94 
Level  0.05 0.15 0.33 0.82 0.78  0.97 
Detrended  0.10 0.28 0.62 0.09 0.08  0.93 
          
Employment Rate         
         
Difference  0.21 0.05 0.08 0.19 0.13  0.93 
Level  0.08 0.08 -0.32 0.86 0.89  0.95 
Detrended  0.06 0.17 -0.11 0.12 0.10  0.92 
         
Total Employment         
         
Difference  0.19 0.06 -0.05 0.10 0.06  0.90 
Level  0.04 0.16 -0.25 0.64 0.52  0.96 
Detrended  0.04 0.20 0.05 0.12 0.09  0.90 
          
 
Table 4.  
 
Prior and Posterior Distributions 
 
 
 Prior  Distribution  Posterior Distribution 
Parameter     Mean s.d.  mean s.d. 
  b  Uniform(0,1) 0.50  0.289 0.42 0.04 
ϕ        Normal(1,0.25) 1.00 0.25  0.80  0.11 
p θ   Uniform(0,0.9) 0.45  0.259  0.53  0.03 
w θ      Uniform(0,0.9) 0.45  0.259  0.05  0.02 
p η    Uniform(0,1) 0.50  0.289 0.02 0.02 
w η   Uniform(0,1) 0.50  0.289 0.42 0.28 
r ρ        Uniform(0,0.97) 0.485 0.284  0.69  0.04 
y φ   Normal(0.5,.125) 0.50  0.13  0.26  0.06 
π φ   Normal(1.5,0.25) 1.50  0.25  1.35  0.13 
g ρ        Uniform(0,0.97) 0.485 0.284  0.93  0.02 
u ρ        Uniform(0,0.97) 0.485 0.284  0.95  0.02 
v ρ        Uniform(0,0.97) 0.485 0.284  0.91  0.01 
z σ   Gamma(25,0.0001) 0.0025 0.0005  0.003  0.000 
a σ      Gamma(25,0.0004) 0.01  0.002  0.009  0.001 
g σ     Gamma(16,0.00125) 0.02 0.005  0.025  0.0024 
u σ     Gamma(4,0.0025) 0.01 0.005  0.011  0.001 





















        
   Output Growth  1.36  1.27  0.60   22.3 % 
        
   Inflation  0.72 %  0.73  0.18  6.0  % 
        
   Interest Rate  0.72  0.67  0.04  0.3 % 
        
   Hours  3.11  4.60  0.42  0.8 % 
        
   Real Wage/Output  3.69  4.44  0.13  0.1 % 
        
Correlation between (dy,dn)  0.75 0.72  -0.49   
           
        
Band-Pass Filtered Data        
        
   Output  2.04  2.04  0.87  18.2 % 
        
   Hours  1.69  1.69  0.26  2.3 % 
        
Correlation between (y,n)  0.88 0.88  -0.14    




















          
Output Growth  4.8 %  22.3 %  57.1 %  8.0 %  7.1 % 
          
Inflation  27.1 %  6.1 %  36.3 %  13.7 %  14.7 % 
          
Nominal Rate  5.0 %  0.4 %  72.3 %  9.8 %  11.8 % 
          
Hours  0.4 %  0.8 %  70.0 %  17.6 %  9.6 % 
          
Wage - Output  0.1 %  0.1 %  73.6 %  12.0 %  12.8 %  
 
 
Table 7.    
 
Technology-Driven Fluctuations Output and Hours:  Correlations   
 




        
Original      -0.14 
      
Flexible Wages      -0.16 
      
Flexible Prices      -0.18 
    
No Habit Formation    -0.29 
    
Flexible Prices and Wages    -0.21 
   
No Frictions (RBC)  0.22 
    















Figure 1. Business Cycle Fluctuations in Output and Hours












Figure 2. The Estimated Effects of Technology Shocks
Difference Specification , 1948:01-2002:04
Productivity: Dynamic Response























































5Figure 3: Sources of U.S. Business Cycle Fluctuations
Difference Specification , Sample Period:1948:01-2002:04
Technology-Driven Fluctuations (BP-filtered)









Other Sources of Fluctuations (BP-filtered)









 Figure 4: Capital Income Tax Rates
A. Jones Series (Level)









C. Jones Series (First-Difference)









B. McGrattan Series (Level)










D. McGrattan Series (First-Difference)









 Figure 5. Technology Shocks: VAR vs. BFK
VAR Permanent Shocks vs. BFK












VAR Transitory Shocks vs. BFK








Figure 6. Hours Worked, 1948-2002
Log Per Capita Hours











Detrended Log Per Capita Hours











 Figure 7 
 
Posterior Impulse Responses to a Technology Shock: 
Model Based Estimates 
 



































































Response of Interest Rates















































Response of Output Growth























  Figure 8   
 
The Role of Technology Shocks in U.S. Postwar Fluctuations: 

























Note:    solid line: technology component (BP-filtered) 
dashed line: U.S. data (BP-filtered) 
 